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Abstract
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has come with new standards and new challenges. This
has sparked concerns about security constraints, despite its ever-increasing role in
business and daily lives. Clearly, IoT contains cloud computing for data processing,
communication infrastructure including the Internet, and sensor nodes. During its
operations, IoT may collect, transmit and process secret data, which trigger security
risks. Nevertheless, implementing security mechanisms for IoT encounters many
challenges due to millions of IoT devices integrated at multiple layers, each of which
has different computation capabilities and security requirements. In addition to that,
sensor nodes in IoT are intended to be battery-based constrained devices with limited
power budget, adequate computation, and small memory footprint to reduce costs.
This work is therefore motivated to focus on applying data encryption to protect
IoT sensor nodes and systems with the consideration of hardware cost, throughput
and power/energy consumption. It will firstly implement an ultra-low-power block
cipher crypto-accelerator with configurable parameters in 28nm FDSOI technology
in SNACk testchip with two cryptography modules: AES and PRESENT. AES is a
widely used data encryption algorithm for the Internet and currently used for new
IoT proposals. PRESENT is a lightweight algorithm which comes up with reduced
security level but requires with much smaller hardware area and lower consumption.
The AES module is a 32-bit datapath architecture containing multiple optimization
strategies supporting multiple security levels from 128-bit keys up to 256-bit keys.
The PRESENT module contains a 64-bit round-based architecture to maximize its
throughput. The measured results indicate that this crypto-accelerator can provide
medium throughput (around 20Mbps at 10MHz), while consumes less than 20µW
at normal condition and sub-pJ of energy per bit. However, the limitation of crypto-
accelerator is that the data has to be read into the crypto-accelerator and written
back to memory which leads to the increase of the power consumption. Following
that, this work looks into an innovative approach to implement the cryptography
algorithm which uses the new proposed In-Memory-Computing SRAM. This aims to
provide a high level of security with flexibility and configurability to adapt to new
standards and to mitigate new attacks. In-Memory Computing SRAM can provide
reconfigurable solutions to implement various security primitives by programming
the memory’s operations. The proposed scheme is to carry out the encryption in the
memory using In-Memory-Computing technology. This work evaluates two possible
mappings of AES and PRESENT using In-Memory Computing.
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Preface
The exponential growth in Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices has brought the world
into a new era of pervasive connectivity where enormous physical things equipped
with sensors, actuators, processors, and transceivers communicate and collaborate
over the Internet. For this intelligence and interconnection, IoT is creating numerous
opportunities to revolutionize the current technologies into smart applications such
as smart homes, smart cities, smart grids, and the like which can help unburden
human life. On the other hand, IoT is also raising security constraints due to the
emergence of new standards and new threats.
IoT has evidently come with new standards, leading to the disparity between the
IoT and the existing computer-based systems or embedded systems. Specifically, im-
plementing IoT requires ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost devices. These are known
as highly constrained devices which can operate for a long lifetime using battery or
even self-harvested energy. They enable new applications such as implant or wear-
able devices, environmental monitoring and so forth. Concurrently, IoT has brought
into play new challenges and countermeasures, for instance, the cost of devices, the
standardization of mechanisms, and the management of millions of lightweight de-
vices, power distribution, security, and privacy. Noticeably, security and low power
consumption are important features to be optimized for IoT sensor nodes. Like con-
strained devices with low resources and limited power supply, IoT sensor nodes need
low-power features to lengthen their operations and security mechanisms to protect
the secret data of users and their privacy.
In particular, IoT devices and data transmitted through multilayer networks may
contain private data or secret data which is threatened by cyber-attacks and organized
crimes on the Internet environment. With millions of IoT devices integrated, this can
open new attack surfaces which focus on IoT devices in order to use them as new
attack tools. Mirai malware which uses vulnerable IoT camera devices is the warning
for IoT system. Notwithstanding, the security feature is still left as an option because
it increases the power consumption and takes extra time-to-market to IoT products.
This leaves rooms for further studies on security to reduce the hardware cost and
power consumption.
Security functions are often based on strong cryptography algorithms such as
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block ciphers, hash functions, and/or public key cryptography which not only re-
quire complicated computations and large power consumption but also reduce the
system throughput. Performing these security algorithms on ultra-low-power devices
is also a challenging task because these devices are lightweight devices with ade-
quate computation capability, small memory footprint and limited power budget.
Therefore, it is critical to optimize cryptographic algorithms in hardware for cost,
throughput and especially power and energy consumption. Given these conditions,
lightweight security mechanisms such as those based on block ciphers and lightweight
block ciphers are considered to be more suitable for constrained devices. To reduce
the power consumption, the implementation of security primitives is performed in the
crypto-accelerator in hardware. This approach is also applicable to high-performance
computing such as Intel CPU or embedded systems such as ARM System-on-Chips.
Nonetheless, cost, throughput and power/energy consumption are different features
which are hard to achieve at the same time.
The disadvantage of hardware crypto-accelerators is that they have fixed hardware
designs, therefore, when there is a flaw in hardware discovered, the only solution is
to make a replacement. This urges the research for new approaches for implementing
flexible security mechanisms.
Current affordable security implementation for IoT often focuses on application
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) with serial processing elements to reduce the hard-
ware cost and power consumption. However, this kind of optimizations, in general,
increases the overall latency and reduce energy efficiency. Specific or fixed security
functions implemented in ASIC are also the drawbacks in the security point of view
because the security standards evolve to adapt to new attacks and to mitigate new
threats. ASIC crypto-accelerators are hard to adapt to these changes because of their
optimal hardware structure to reduce the hardware cost and power consumption. In
addition, to optimize the power consumption, IoT devices often contain a system
on chip with multiple hardware modules from different vendors. These hardware
modules might include hardware Trojans which might monitor and expose the secret
data transported by the system buses. Furthermore, the extra cost is spent to read
the data from the memory to the crypto-accelerator and to write the data back to
the memory. Therefore, certain trade-offs should be considered to include flexible
security solutions for long lifetime constrained devices.
In-Memory Computing is a new advancement of memory technology which can
perform logical operations such as AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR directly using
the memory structure. It is a promising technology to implement different security
algorithms because data in the memory can be encrypted in place without being
transferred to the processing unit. This minimizes data transfer overhead and the
chance of exposing raw data to the system bus. However, because of the serial oper-
ations of In-Memory Computing, its flexibility, which can map different algorithms
to adapt to new standards or to cope with different attacks, has to be traded off with
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the speed and the power/energy consumption of the crypto-accelerators. In-Memory
Computing has some important advantages over the traditional methods in terms of
security, but it needs in-deep investigation.
To shed some light on the situation, this work firstly focuses on the power/energy
consumption optimization of block ciphers which can be used to implement differ-
ent security primitives to secure the data and communication in IoT systems. The
power consumption of both conventional and lightweight algorithms will be carefully
evaluated. This work proposes a low-power implementation of two standardized al-
gorithms which can be used for ultra-low-power IoT devices. The first one, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), is a conventional algorithm widely used to secure the
Internet applications with high levels of security. The other is PRESENT, a new
lightweight algorithm which uses hardware constructs to reduce the hardware area
and the power consumption. Implementation results show that the lightweight im-
plementation can provide lower power consumption than the traditional one but with
the sacrifice of security levels. On the other hand, IoT devices might have different
security requirements depending on the applications and the available power/energy
budget. Therefore, in the next step, this work combines the two modules, AES and
PRESENT, into a crypto-accelerator. IoT applications can choose the high secure
algorithm with more power consumption or in the critical condition the lightweight
one to lengthen its battery life. This crypto-accelerator has been fabricated using
28nm FD-SOI technology in SNACk testchip. The results indicate that this crypto-
accelerator can provide sub-pJ/bit operations.
Not only optimizing the power consumption, but the security evaluation using
the current state-of-the-art methods are also applied to the proposed design. Two
notable evaluation methods are employed in this work including Correlation Power
Analysis (CPA) and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA). TVLA can address
different information leakages in the proposed designs while CPA can be used to
mount the key recovery attack. The evaluation results using the estimated power
traces of the post-signoff netlist show that the proposed design with optimization for
low power consumption achieved equivalent information leakage in comparison with
the reference design on OpenCores.
Last but not least, from the lesson of various security breaches because of the
fixed hardware security module, this work finally explores the configurability, the
flexibility and the feasibility of different block cipher algorithms using In-Memory
Computing. This work proposes the implementation of two algorithms, which are
previously designed in the aforementioned crypto-accelerator, using the In-Memory
Computing technology. The implementation results using the behavior model of
In-Memory Computing show that the conventional algorithm, AES, with byte level
transformation has eight times higher throughput than the bit-level permutation,
PRESENT. In addition, because of the serial operations, the security functions using
this technology have to trade off flexibility and configurability with throughput and
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power consumption. The implementation of AES and PRESENT using In-Memory
Computing is at least five times slower than the one in the crypto-accelerator. Secu-
rity functions in memory can also be equipped with the countermeasures for software
implementations, but it needs careful investigations.
Motivations and objectives
Many researches have been focusing on reducing the area and power consumption of
cryptographic hardware primitives so that they can be used for constrained devices.
As a result, a new class of cryptography algorithms named Lightweight Cryptogra-
phy has emerged to fulfill the new requirements. Lightweight cryptography considers
the trade-offs among area, throughput, power consumption and security features by
reducing the security levels to achieve small hardware footprint and low power con-
sumption. In general, the lightweight approach is expected to reduce the data block
size and the key size to minimize the hardware area and also the power consumption
but this leads to the reduction in security level. Regardless of new advancements
in cryptography, many new IoT proposals have chosen AES as the main primitive.
Therefore, the optimization for AES is considered to be critical not only for IoT
applications but also for other products which use AES.
In addition, lightweight cryptography which uses the hardware-friendly construct
to reduce the hardware cost and power consumption is a promising candidate for
ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost applications even though they might reduce the
level of security. However, lightweight cryptography has not been selected for recent
IoT proposals yet.
On the other hand, depending on the applications’ profile, ultra-low-power devices
might adapt to different security levels by selecting between conventional security al-
gorithms such as AES or the lightweight ones, for instance, PRESENT. Configurable
implementations will increase flexibility and configurability.
Furthermore, hardware implementations of security functions for ultra-low-cost
and ultra-low-power devices often use fixed architecture with fixed algorithms which
cannot adapt to new standards and against new attacks. With new advancement
of the memory technologies, In-Memory Computing which can be programmed to
execute logical operation directly in the memory banks might open a new solution
to address this problem. The memory can be programmed to execute the security
primitives in place without data transfer through the system bus. In-Memory Com-
puting can be an innovative solution for security, but it needs careful investigation
and evaluations.
The objective of this PhD’s work is firstly to investigate different security mech-
anisms, which are suitable for highly-constrained IoT devices, to search for a good
trade-off among security level, hardware cost and power/energy consumption. After
that, two algorithms including a highly-secure algorithm – AES and a lightweight al-
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gorithm – PRESENT were chosen to be implemented into a crypto-accelerator with
multiple levels of security. An optimization strategy for AES and PRESENT was
proposed to reduce its power consumption. Secondly, the implementation results of
AES and PRESENT are analyzed to extract the power traces for security evaluation.
Finally, in the search for an innovative approach to design security functions for
IoT, the design of two algorithms using In-Memory Computing is implemented and
evaluated. Security mechanisms implemented using In-Memory Computing are more
flexible in comparison with the hardware accelerator because they are reconfigurable
and can be used to map different algorithms to accelerate the computation directly in
the memory array. In-Memory Computing provides flexibility and configurability to
adapt to future IoT standards and to cope with new attacks, but it has to trade the
flexibility and configurability for higher power consumption and lower throughput
than the proposed crypto-accelerator.
Explanation for the different CMOS technologies used
in this thesis
This thesis’ work has been conducted under the collaboration among VNU Univer-
sity of Engineering and Technology (VNU-UET) – a member university of Vietnam
National University, University of Grenoble-Alpes and CEA-Leti/DACLE in France.
It involved the participation of two laboratories including the Key Laboratory for
Smart Integrated Systems (SISLAB), VNU-UET, and Digital Architecture (LISAN),
CEA-Leti/DACLE, France. The two-thirds period of the work was performed in
LISAN which has access to 28nm FD-SOI technology and TSMC 65nm. At the be-
ginning of the work, the designs are experimented using TSMC 65nm to prepare the
simulation and evaluation environment in the local computer in the lab. Some exper-
iments require an extremely large amount of disk space which can only be performed
using the local computer. However, the fabricated demonstration was implemented
using ST 28nm FD-SOI technology. All the measured results are originated from this
technology. The remaining of the research including Chapter 4 was completed in SIS-
LAB which does not have access to the technologies as in CEA-Leti. Therefore, the
experiments performed in SISLAB use 45nm technology from North Carolina State
University (NCSU) education platform development kit [FreePDK45nm]. The stan-
dard cells are from Nangate [Nangate2011OCL]. The SRAM cells and the memory
peripheral were built based on the OpenRAM compiler [Guthaus2016oao].
Contributions of the work
• Design of a low-power low-cost crypto-accelerator which can be used
for ultra-low-power IoT applications
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The current state-of-the-art of cryptography was studied in terms of hardware
cost, power/energy consumption, throughput and security features. After that,
two block ciphers are selected for implementation including a traditional al-
gorithm – AES, and a lightweight algorithm – PRESENT. An optimization
strategy to optimize AES hardware module was proposed based on 32-bit dat-
apath architecture. This crypto-accelerator was integrated as an IP into the
SNACk testchip. It was fabricated in 28nm FD-SOI technology. The measured
power consumption results show that it can achieve very low power consump-
tion down to 20µW for AES at 10MHz and throughput of 28Mbps, and 10µW
for PRESENT with the throughput of 17Mbps at the same operating frequency.
• Perform security evaluation of AES crypto-core in SNACk using the
post-signoff power estimation traces
One of the weaknesses in hardware crypto-accelerators is the hardware secu-
rity attack such as power analysis attacks. Designing countermeasure is not
a part of this work because this work mainly focuses on optimizing the power
consumption along with the considerations of hardware costs, throughput and
security level. Therefore, this work does not include countermeasures. How-
ever, the security evaluation framework using Correlation Power Analysis and
Test Vector Leakage Assessment is proposed for early design testing based on
the post-signoff power estimation to verify that no security weakness was in-
troduced during the optimization. The framework has successfully revealed the
secret key of the reference design on Opencores and the design in this work.
The design in this work with power optimization has a certain level of resistance
to these types of attacks. It means that the proposed optimization did not add
security leakage.
• Design and implementation of AES and PRESENT in an innovative
In-Memory Computing architecture
Crypto-accelerators have low cost, low power consumption, however, they are
fixed after the chip fabrication. In contrast, the attack methods are changing
very fast, thus, the flaws are discovered, these hardware structures must be
replaced to maintain the security feature. In this work, a configurable crypto-
accelerator is proposed using the In-Memory Computing architecture. This
work uses the memory bitcells proposed by Akyel el al. [Akyel2016ddr] to map
AES and PRESENT on this platform. For a 32-bit datapath architecture, AES
takes 232 clock cycles to finish one encryption while PRESENT needs 873 clock
cycles. Because of the bit based permutation, PRESENT implementation using
In-Memory computing are eight times slower than AES.
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Organization of the manuscript
The rests of the manuscript are organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the
Internet-of-things (IoT) and the requirements of ultra-low-power IoT applications. It
also analyzes the importance of security in the IoT systems and the security challenges
in IoT. The IoT applications are expected to be highly-constrained devices to reduce
the cost with very low power consumption. Therefore, implementing security into
these devices to reduce cost and power consumption is seen as a challenging task.
Chapter 2 summarizes the security features in IoT and reviews the current state
of the art of security for constrained devices. It also presents the reason why block
ciphers including AES and PRESENT are selected to be implemented for IoT. The
chapter provides a scanning of the current hardware implementations of AES and
lightweight cryptography. It additionally looks into the hardware security problems.
Moreover, this chapter has two sections on the implementations of AES which use
the SRAM memory and the configurable cryptographic modules, which are directly
related to the manuscript’s proposals in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Chapter 3 presents a proposal of a low-power crypto-accelerator containing two
block ciphers – AES and PRESENT. The proposal firstly involves the implementa-
tion of SNACk testchip in 28nm FD-SOI from STMicrolectronics. Furthermore, the
chapter presents these implementation results including the power estimation and
the measured results of SNACk. Finally, the security evaluation of AES in SNACk
test chip is also presented and evaluated in this chapter.
Chapter 4 proposes an innovative method to map block ciphers into hardware
using the In-Memory Computing mechanisms. It begins with the demonstration of
the memory constructions to support In-Memory Computing. It then continues with
the mapping of the block ciphers including AES and PRESENT using the memory
construction which is previously described.
Finally, the author concludes the contributions of the study in this manuscript.
Additionally, it raises some perspectives on which further researches would be bene-
ficial.
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Chapter 1
Ultra-Low-Power applications for IoT and
security problems
Security has arisen as one of the key areas that developers of Internet-of-Things ap-
plications are trying to make it better. On the one hand, the advent of IoT has
dramatically enabled miniaturized computing platforms such as implant or wearable
devices, health monitoring, environmental monitoring and the likes due to its charac-
teristics as constrained devices which can operate for a long lifetime using batteries
or even self-harvested energy. On the other hand, the computing capability of these
devices in a pervasively connected environment has also considerably raised the con-
cerns about the misuse of collecting, processing and exchanging of user data. More
precisely, the demand for information security and privacy protection comes integrally
to the daily operations and the integration over the Internet of these new classes of
IoT backed applications. Meanwhile, IoT differs from the existing computer-based
systems or embedded systems in terms of both connectivity and the fact that IoT
needs to be implemented in ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost devices. These devices
are lightweight devices with limited processing power, small memory footprint and
low power budget. On the contrary, strong cryptography algorithms such as block
ciphers, hash functions, and/or public key cryptography are usually employed for
security functions. However, these firm cryptography algorithms require complicated
computations and high power consumption which diminish the system throughput.
Consequently, performing cryptography algorithms on ultra-low-power devices is set
to be an extremely challenging task.
In addition, IoT ecosystems are evolving with new standards, new security threats
and attacks discovered. Therefore, flexible and configurable solutions for IoT security
are required to adapt to these factors. Software implementations of security functions
have more flexibility than hardware implementations because new standards and
bug fixes can be done by updating the software. However, software implementation
reduces the overall throughput of the system and cause higher power consumption.
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Current affordable security solutions are focusing on implementing security functions
as hardware accelerator with serial processing to reduce hardware cost and optimize
power consumption. However, they are specific hardware with fixed functionalities
which do not provide the flexibility and configurability.
With the new advancement of memory technologies, In-Memory Computing is
a new technology which can perform logical and arithmetic computations in place
of the memory. It can be used to implement different algorithms including security
primitives. In-Memory Computing can provide more flexible solutions than specific
hardware accelerator with low power consumption. However, because of the serial
operations of the memory, the flexibility has been traded off with the throughput
and power consumption. This new mechanism needs in-deep analysis to prove its
advantages.
The purpose of this chapter is to firstly review various aspects of IoT systems
which lead to the requirement of ultra-low-power features. After that, it analyzes the
security problems in IoT and possible security mechanisms for IoT. Consequently,
it explores the possible solutions for ultra-low-power devices which are based on
the block ciphers and lightweight blocks ciphers. Furthermore, it also addresses the
security challenges in IoT in terms of attack surfaces and standardization which leads
to the requirements of a flexible and configurable design for security. These ideas are
further developed with the proposals of this work in the following chapters.
This chapter begins with Section 1.1 reviewing the organization of IoT systems
and addressing the security problems and application requirements for IoT. It fur-
ther raises the importance of ultra-low-power features for IoT sensor nodes. Section
1.2 embodies various security mechanisms applicable to IoT sensor nodes. Then, it
raises the new constraints of IoT applications which can be provided by lightweight
cryptography especially in terms of hardware cost and power consumption. This sec-
tion additionally compares the complexity of different security primitives which can
be employed for IoT. In Section 1.3, different challenges regarding security for IoT
are discussed. In return, it also analyzes strong security mechanisms which can be
applied to IoT in the future if there is a practical implementation. The chapter ends
with some conclusions and perspectives presented in Section 1.4.
1.1 Introduction to Internet-of-Things applications
and requirements for Ultra-Low-Power features
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is a new concept of connected objects through the Inter-
net. An object or a thing is a physical thing or a device which has the capabilities of
computation and communication through the global network – the Internet. Because
of the Internet connectivity and computation capability, a thing can capture data,
preprocess them, and then send the results to the cloud through the Internet. In the
cloud, the data can be further processed by artificial intelligence (AI) applications.
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Figure 1.2: IoT applications and their expected market share (Source: McKinsey
Global Institute (June 2015)).
The success of IoT is based on many enabling technologies. As indicated by Al-
Fuqaha et al. in [Al-Fuqaha2015iot], IoT is the combination of different technologies
including identification technology, sensing technology, communication technology,
computation technology and the software parts such as services and semantics. Iden-
tification technology is used to address and name the object in the network so that
each object can be referred to using a unique identifier. Sensing technology provides
the ability to capture the changes in the environment surrounding objects. Two
most important technologies enabling IoT are communication technology and com-
putation technology. Communication technology enables the seamless integration of
many IoT devices in a small area using wireless technology such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth
BLE, IEEE 802.11.4, Z-wave, Sigfox and LoRaWan, and so forth. The computa-
tions in IoT Smart Objects rely on processing units such as an embedded processor
or a System-on-Chip (SoC) which does fast processing of the data. Many compu-
tations will be done in the cloud which needs supercomputers with acceleration to
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do complicated machine learning algorithms or big data applications. Based on the
computation capability, different services which will provide data access for differ-
ent applications. Finally, to provide data for them, the semantics of data should be
defined to provide interoperability among applications.
Figure 1.3: Internet-of-Things landscape.
IoT has opened new areas for application development. Figure 1.3 shows an
example of different applications, platforms and enabling technologies for IoT. For
personal use, IoT can be used in smart homes or personal things such as smart
watches or e-health devices. For industry, IoT brings better monitoring and logistic
capability which will boost the performance and the efficiency in factories. For our
society, IoT with smart cities, smart grid and so on brings a new level of efficiency
and can help to build a sustainable environment. In summary, IoT and Artificial
Intelligence (AI) create a new world of smart things and objects which is expected
to be sold in large quantities in the coming years.
IoT is creating a world of limitless potential, but it is not without challenges.
Standardization appears to be a critical issue when it comes to adoption of IoT in
different industries such as industrial IoT, agriculture IoT or IoT for healthcare, i.e.
which among various enabling technology for IoT to be applied in such fields. This
leads to difficulties in developing interoperable applications. In addition to that,
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different applications and services might have different requirements and interfaces;
making it strenuous to create an interoperable system. What is more, with the in-
tegration of thousands of devices, the bandwidth will become an evident bottleneck
for IoT. This leads to the development of Fog/Edge computing which will implement
the preprocessing tasks at the edge devices. The implementation of heavy computa-
tion at the edge or device levels will trigger a problem for power consumption. IoT
devices supposed to be low-cost devices with the battery-based power supply or even
power harvesting. Therefore, the optimization for low power of IoT systems will be
important for the future IoT device. Finally, IoT is posing serious issues of security
and privacy as highlighted by the current surveys on IoT such as [Atzori2010tio],
[Yang2017aso], [Lin2017aso], [Al-Fuqaha2015iot]. The Internet is exposed to many
critical bugs, even with the state-of-the-art security systems. IoT is built on the In-
ternet infrastructure, hence, inherits all the implicit issues of the Internet including
security challenges. Furthermore, many IoT devices are supposed to be constrained
low-cost devices with adequate processing power, small memory footprint, and even
limited power/energy budget; for example, power-harvesting devices and battery-
based devices. As a result, dealing with security problems for these constraint devices
is even more challenging.
In the light of these conditions, this study focuses on power/energy optimization
for security components for IoT devices/sensor nodes. They are low-cost constrained
devices with small memory footprint with reduced computation capabilities to min-
imize the cost and power consumption. Figure 1.4 shows the energy per bit of the
most important components of such devices including communication, computation
and security. It is clear from Figure 1.4 that security is an additional feature, but it
consumes a large amount of energy. Therefore, optimization for power and energy
consumption of IoT devices is becoming vital for future IoT applications. It has
been shown that for constrained IoT devices, security functions on pure software are
not efficient in terms of throughput and power consumption [Zhang2018rar]. Data
encryption/decryption using software not only reduces the throughput of the ap-
plication but also occupies the CPU runtime. This leads to an increase in power
consumption and energy consumption of devices. Eventually, most of the works on
the optimization of security primitives for low power have been focusing on hardware
architectures. In addition, power consumption optimization for security algorithms
on hardware is a challenging problem to such extent that the security algorithms
especially the encryption and decryption are pseudorandom algorithms. The ran-
domness makes it hard to define a clear strategy for optimizing power consumption.
Furthermore, optimization for power consumption might cause other security issues,
for example, the leakage of the credential information through the implementation.
Side-channel attack techniques such as power analysis attacks [Kocher1999dpa] use
power consumption as an attack vector. Consequently, power consumption optimiza-
tion should consider this issue. This work also seeks for a new method to increase
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the security feature and to reduce the power consumption of the system. Part of
the work experiments with a new type of memory which is capable of performing
logical operations. This can be a new approach to implement security primitives in
the future.
Figure 1.4: Energy per bit of different components in IoT (Source: [Yang2017hdf]).
In summary, IoT brings countless benefits not only to individual and industrial
uses but also for the society at large. On the other hand, it also presents unique
challenges, among which the ultra-low power capability and security will be two
areas of concern in this work. Ultra-low power capability will help to deploy IoT
applications on a larger scale with battery-based and power-harvesting devices while
security will ensure the critical information not to be exposed to attackers. It should
also be emphasized that for many applications, security is an important additional
feature, but it requires a large amount of power consumption. In addition, IoT
standards and proposals have to evolve to adapt to new security requirements and
to cope with new threats. Therefore, a flexible and configurable security solution
should be taken into account. For this reason, the security functions for ultra-low
power IoT applications with flexibility and configurability are worth considering and
will be reviewed in the next section.
1.2 Security mechanisms and lightweight cryptogra-
phy
Attacks on IoT enabled devices and recent hardware attacks lately have brought into
play the concerns about the security of IoT applications. As proof, Mirai malware
in [Sinanovic2017aom] has affected numerous weak-password IoT cameras. They are
later used as a botnet for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on Domain
Name Server (DNS) provider Dyn. Mirai malware reveals that weak-security IoT
devices can be used not only to collect data but also to mount attacks on another
system. Mirai malware also demonstrates new attack vectors. Instead of focusing on
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the computers or their users, in the IoT era, hackers might focus on the devices and
use them as a mean to attack other parts in the IoT system. In addition, in terms
of hardware security, the recent findings of Spectre [Kocher2018sae] and Meltdown
[Lipp2018m], which exploited the security hole in the current computer architectures
and affected billions of computers and devices, again highlighted the importance of
designs for security. A security hole in hardware architectures will create a larger
impact because hardware components especially integrated IP cores in systems-on-
chip are hard to fix and replace.
A strong-security computer-based system might require security features, for in-
cluding confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, auditability, trustworthi-
ness, non-repudiation and privacy as described in Table 1.1. Confidentiality ensures
the secrecy of the data while integrity enforces the non-modification of the data.
Availability ensures that the system and service are available when requested by
an authorized user. Accountability addresses the users’ responsibility for their ac-
tions, whereas auditability provides the capability to persistently monitor all actions.
Trustworthiness facilitates an ability to verify, identify and establish trust in a third
party’s environment. Last but not least, privacy puts the system in place to comply
with the privacy policies, at the same time, enables individuals to control their per-
sonal information. Fulfilling all these security requirements has already been a great
challenge, even for a computer-based system.
For computer-based systems and their interconnected networks, the above se-
curity requirement can be ensured by using the standardized security mechanisms
and recommendations as suggested by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
[Bellovin2003smi] as below.
1. One-Time Password for authentication and identification.
2. HMAC – a preferred shared-secret authentication technique.
3. IPsec – a generic IP-layer encryption and authentication protocol.
4. TLS – an encrypted, authenticated channel that runs on top of TCP.
5. SASL – a framework for negotiating an authentication and encryption mecha-
nism to be used over a TCP stream.
6. GSS-API – a framework for applications to use when they require authentica-
tion, integrity, and/or confidentiality.
7. DNSSEC – digitally signs DNS records.
8. Digital Signatures – one of the strongest forms of challenge/response authenti-
cation using public key cryptography.
9. OpenPGP and S/MIME – two different secure mail protocols.
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10. Firewalls and Topology: Firewalls are a topological defense mechanism.
11. Kerberos – a mechanism for two entities to authenticate each other and ex-
change keying material.
12. SSH – a secure connection between client and server.
Although the aforementioned mechanisms are widely used in the current Internet ap-
plications, they require complicated software and hardware implementations which
are not suitable for constrained IoT devices. Constrained IoT devices may provide
only adequate supports for requirements such as confidentiality, integrity, identifi-
cation and authentication. Other requirements could make constrained IoT devices
more usable, but they are not mandatory.
Table 1.1: Common security requirements for Internet-based System
Requirement Definition
Confidentiality Ensuring that only authorized users access
the information
Integrity Ensuring that data is not modified
Availability Ensuring that all system services are avail-
able when requested by an authorized user
Accountability An ability of a system to hold users’ respon-
sibility for their actions
Auditability An ability of a system to persistently monitor
all actions
Trustworthiness An ability of a system to verify identify and
establish trust in a third party
Non-repudiation An ability of a system to confirm
occurrence/non-occurrence of an action
Privacy Ensuring that the system obeys privacy poli-
cies and enabling individuals to control their
personal information
Constrained IoT devices need special consideration for security not only because
of the cost but also the power/energy consumption as well as the time to market
it will incur. Instead of meeting all the security requirements as described in Table
1.1, they might have only a subset of lightweight security mechanisms which provides
trade-offs among cost, power consumption and energy consumption. The lightweight
security requirements and the associated security tools for IoT are described in Table
1.2. IoT devices might require the authentication and identification of the IoT node
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so that only authenticated devices can join the network. IoT nodes may contain
secret data; therefore, they need data protection to protect their data from unautho-
rized access. IoT data will be analyzed to make a decision to react to the changes;
therefore, they should not be modified. This feature is protected by data and device
integrity. Furthermore, IoT devices may contain wireless communication, which can
be easily captured through the air by the attackers. This brings on the importance
of protecting the communication channel so that the data will remain secret. In ad-
dition, the software and firmware running on IoT devices should be protected from
reverse engineering and unintended modification. Finally, the availability of IoT de-
vices should be ensured so that they can run endlessly. These requirements can be
met by using current security tools such as data encryption, digital signatures, cryp-
tographic hash functions, and other security protocols. In addition, they are built
based on strong secure primitives which are cryptography functions including sym-
metric cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, cryptographic hash functions and so
son.
Table 1.2: Security requirements for constrained IoT devices
Features Description Security tools
Authentication and
identification of the
IoT nodes
Ensuring the IoT node is
not the unwanted one
Digital Signatures
Cryptographic Hash Function
Physical Unclonable Function
Data protection Protecting the IoT data
from unauthorized par-
ties
Data Encryption
Data/device in-
tegrity
Protecting the IoT data
and devices from un-
wanted modification
Cryptographic Hash Function
Communication
protection
Creating a secure
communication chan-
nel among IoT de-
vices/sensor networks
Secure protocols:
TLS/SSL
DTLS
IPSec
Data encryption
Firmware and/or
Software protection
Do not allow unautho-
rized modification of the
firmware or software
Firmware/software encryption
Digital signature
Device/data avail-
ability
Preventing the IoT de-
vices from DoS attacks
DoS detection and prevention
Currently, available lightweight cryptographic primitives can be considered so-
lutions for existing security problems on IoT constrained devices. As a matter of
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fact, devices and protocols with proper usage of identification, authentication and
data encryption will reduce the risk of exposing secret or personal data to attackers.
These cryptographic primitives contain two main categories: asymmetric cryptogra-
phy (or public-key cryptography) and symmetric cryptography. Nonetheless, current
asymmetric cryptography has not been yet suitable for constrained devices such as
constrained IoT devices because it uses computationally intensive algorithms such as
RSA [Rivest1978amf] or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [Koblitz1978ecc]; and
consequently, it needs complex calculations, large memories to store the keys, and
high power consumption. Table 1.3 illustrates the security levels of symmetric cryp-
tography and its equivalent asymmetric cryptography. As obviously seen, asymmetric
cryptography requires not only more processing power but also more memory and
storage than symmetric cryptography. In addition, IoT applications require multi-
ple security mechanisms such as identification, authentication and data encryption.
Asymmetric cryptography is more flexible in the application point of view, but it
takes more processing power, more data storage and much more power consumption
even when the cryptography modules are implemented in hardware.
Table 1.3: Security level recommended by ECRYPT-II [ECRYPT-II]
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Attacks in "real-time" by individuals; only acceptable for 
authentication tag size 32 - - - - - 
2 
Very short-term protection against small organizations; 
should not be used for confidentiality in new systems 64 128 816 128 816 128 
3 
Short-term protection against medium organizations, 
medium-term protection against small organizations 72 144 1008 144 1008 144 
4 
Very short-term protection against agencies, long-term 
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5 Legacy standard level 96 192 1776 192 1776 192 
6 Medium-term protection 112 224 2432 224 2432 224 
7 Long-term protection 128 256 3248 256 3248 256 
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The asymmetric cryptography system or the public-key cryptography system uses
a pair of keys as described in Figure 1.5(b): a public key for encrypting the plaintext
and a private key to decrypt the ciphertext. In contrast, the symmetric cryptography
system uses only one key on both sides as presented in Figure 1.5(a). This shared
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Figure 1.5: Symmetric cryptography scheme and asymmetric cryptography scheme.
key must be known in advance to do the communication. The public key can be
distributed to everyone while the private key is known to only the owner. In a
secure system using asymmetric cryptography, the sender will use the public key
to encrypt the message, while only the owner can decrypt the encrypted one with
his private key. Asymmetric cryptography is often based on hard problems such as
factorization of big prime numbers or the elliptic curves. However, to keep the system
secure, asymmetric cryptography often uses big numbers with the size of thousands
of bits. Asymmetric cryptography is more flexible because anyone taking part in
the communication can have the public key of the receiver however only the receiver
can decrypt the message. By doing this, the sender and the receiver can verify the
identity of each other. Consequently, asymmetric cryptography is widely used for
key distribution and digital signature. It is also used for high-level security protocols
such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS),
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and so on.
In a practical system, both asymmetric cryptography and symmetric cryptogra-
phy are used. Asymmetric cryptography provides high-level protocols such as key
exchange, key distribution and key update while symmetric cryptography is used as
the main data encryption methods. The drawback of the systems which use only
symmetric cryptography is that the shared secret key must be known in advance.
After that, application key exchange, key distribution and key update can be im-
plemented based on the shared secret key. The shared secret key can also be used
as a method for authentication. This shared key can be programmed using a secure
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Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) at the time of application development. Compared to
asymmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography is used more often in practical
systems because of its high throughput.
On the other hand, symmetric cryptography including block cipher and stream
cipher is adapted to data encryption because of its fast operations (mostly XORs and
permutations). Between two types of symmetric cryptography algorithms, stream
ciphers are capable of generating the encrypted data stream very fast, but they
are limited to only stream data encryption. Notwithstanding, block ciphers can be
configured for various security functions using the operation modes to be used as a
stream cipher, a block cipher or a mechanism for authentication. It is more flexible
for applications to use block ciphers for different security purposes. Among block
cipher algorithms, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [FIPS-197] is considered
a well-studied algorithm which is widely used in the current standards not only for
IoT but also other applications such as network protocols, data encryption, storage
encryption, etc.
New block cipher algorithms which are lightweight in terms of hardware or soft-
ware implementation and memory footprints have emerged recently, but they have
come up with reduced security levels such as PRESENT [Bogdanov2007pau]. They,
in fact, have small hardware implementation area but use more encryption rounds and
smaller block sizes leading to lower throughput. More importantly, these lightweight
algorithms are not adopted in the new IoT proposals yet due to the shortage of their
studies in security and protocols. Thus, AES is still selected as the main primitive
for security mechanism in the emerging proposals targeting IoT applications, for ex-
ample, IEEE802.15.4 [LRWPAN], LoraWan [LoRaWan], Zigbee [Zigbee] and in other
Internet standards.
The innovation of new lightweight cryptography algorithms [ISO-29192-2] comes
from new applications which have limited power budget such as RFID applications
[ISO-29167-1, NIST-SP-800-98]. RFID cards do not have their power supply. The en-
ergy is harvested through the reader’s electromagnetic waves. The harvested power
supply is limited while the conventional cryptography algorithms need large area
footprint and power consumption. This leads to a new class of cryptography al-
gorithms to support these devices. Figure 1.6 shows the differences between two
types of cryptography algorithms. The traditional algorithms such as AES focus on
the security feature which has high levels of security; while lightweight cryptogra-
phy aims attention at the effectiveness of the algorithms not only in security feature
but also in terms of performance, power budget, and throughput and so on. Cur-
rent lightweight algorithms concentrate on reducing power consumption by using
the hardware structure such as employing wire permutation. The security feature
in lightweight cryptography is traded off with the power consumption and the cost
of the area of the implementation in hardware; while the traditional algorithms are
optimized for software implementation.
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Figure 1.6: Comparison between traditional and lightweight block cipher algorithms.
Overall, a variety of security mechanisms for the Internet and applications could
be implemented to ensure a certain level of security. However, they are considered
to be more suitable for software on the computer. A new series of problems aris-
ing urges the implementation of security for constrained devices with limited power
budgets such as RFID tags or power-harvesting devices. This leads to a new class
of lightweight cryptography algorithms with small area footprint, ultra-low power
consumption, reduced security levels and lower throughput. Finding a good trade-off
among security, throughput, area, and power and energy consumption, therefore, will
be a key issue for future IoT devices.
1.3 Security challenges in IoT
The first security problem lies in the scale and scope of IoT deployment. As a large
variety of devices will be integrated, with varying security supporting mechanisms
and communication/computation capabilities. As a result, a weakness in one of the
devices in this system can reveal the secrecy of the whole system. Furthermore,
the constrained IoT devices with limited computation capability and security mech-
anisms would become the weak points in the system. These devices are becoming
a new attack surface in the IoT era. Figure 1.7 illustrates the number of devices
in different layers in IoT systems and their corresponding security levels. In the
clouds and the Internet backbone, strong security mechanisms can be applied with
well-defined security features and threat models. However, at perception layers, for
the constrained devices, lightweight security mechanisms are employed to reduce the
cost and power consumption. With millions of devices involved, in the case of some
devices containing weak security, the secrecy of the system could be vulnerable to
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Figure 1.8: IoT security threats and possible countermeasures [Mosenia2017acs].
throughput and usability. Additionally, a high level of security on embedded devices
will raise the cost of the system. Moreover, security evaluation with security evalu-
ation lab’s certificate is a long process which will add not only the cost but also the
time-to-market to the product.
Apart from that, in line with the development of quantum computers and new
computation architectures, the current cryptographic schemes are likely to be broken
in the future. For example, the current asymmetric cryptography algorithms such as
RSA are predicted to be collapsed easily by quantum computers. For that reason,
new cryptographic primitives need to be developed to mitigate the new attacks from
quantum computers. Some solutions could be practiced including lattice cryptogra-
phy and homomorphic encryption; however, they are not as efficient in the current
computer system. These new cryptographic schemes are even more costly and con-
sume a large amount of power even when running at low throughput. They are not
suitable for embedded system and especially constrained IoT devices. Despite the
impractical implementations of lattice cryptography and homomorphic encryption at
the moment, they open many new interesting application areas. For example, with
homomorphic encryption, the data from IoT devices can be encrypted and processed
in the encrypted domain. The data do not need to be decrypted in the server or the
cloud. This is perfectly fit in a wide range of Internet applications including IoT.
Figure 1.9 shows mechanisms which can be used with homomorphic encryption to
provide better security and privacy for IoT systems. With homomorphic encryption,
computers can work on encrypted data to serve encrypted requests from users. All
the computations are in the encrypted domain; therefore, the providers do not know
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the secrecy of the data and the request. This would be a far future of security and
privacy. At the moment, these concepts are too costly for current computer systems
and it is hard to apply to IoT constrained devices.
Encrypted data, outsourced 
computation
Requests processed on 
encrypted data
Private requests on public 
data
Figure 1.9: Homomorphic encryption and its applications to IoT [Aguilar2013rai].
The implementation of security functions in IoT also hinders in standardization.
Different enabling technologies for IoT have different security mechanisms based
on their needs. This leads to the problem of supporting multiple security mecha-
nisms in a system with different components. For constrained IoT devices, there are
lightweight cryptography algorithms and mechanisms which are already standard-
ized; however, they are not used in the recent IoT proposals. In the recent proposals,
AES is still used as the main security mechanisms for data encryption, data integrity
and network protections leading to the demand for optimization of AES for cost,
performance and power consumption for constrained IoT devices. Table 1.4 shows
some recent proposals for IoT systems in which AES is widely used as the main se-
curity mechanisms. This is because AES is proved to be secure by a large number of
researches on its security features.
New ideas have been proposed in the search for new mechanisms and more efficient
computation for the security of IoT constrained devices, for instance, approximate
Computing [Gao2017acf] or In-Memory Computing [Wang2016dad] for data encryp-
tion. However, further studies are needed to assess the effectiveness of these new
mechanisms. In this work, the encryption using In-Memory Computing will be ex-
plored in terms of power consumption and security features. Two algorithms: AES
– a traditional cryptography algorithm, and PRESENT – a standardized lightweight
one will be investigated using the new computing mechanisms. PRESENT was cho-
sen because it is designed for constrained devices which are expected to reduce the
hardware cost and power consumption with a reduced security level, while AES is
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Table 1.4: Some proposals for IoT with security features
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N/A Source code 
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AES 128 CCM 
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Full SW 
security stack
AES-128/256
a traditional algorithm with high-level of security. Pushing the encryption into the
memory is expected to mitigate the risk of moving unencrypted data through the sys-
tem bus as well as the risk of unauthorized access from other IP cores in the system.
Furthermore, these memories with computing capability can be easily integrated into
sensors even without an embedded processor.
Security implementation should be addressed carefully with good trade-offs among
hardware cost, system throughput and power/energy consumption. Figure 1.10 de-
scribes the trade-offs among different aspects of the hardware implementation of the
cryptography algorithms. At the algorithmic level, security is related to block sizes,
key sizes and the number of rounds of cryptography algorithms. Algorithms, which
have large block sizes, key sizes and numbers of rounds, usually provide high levels of
security. However, large block sizes and key sizes require many registers to store them
and the intermediate results which, in turn, require more hardware area and power
consumption. In addition, a large number of rounds tends to reduce the throughput
of algorithms and increase energy consumption as they use more loops to output
the encrypted messages. Conventionally, cryptography algorithms are designed for
security with software implementation to run in computer systems, however, in or-
der to optimize throughput and power consumption for embedded systems, they are
now integrated into a System-on-Chip system which is implemented in hardware.
Along with security, the two new aspects, the total occupied area of the hardware
implementation and its throughput must be considered. It will not be easy to opti-
mize these aspects with new requirements of constrained devices, i.e. limited power
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1.4 Conclusion
All things considered, the Internet-of-things presents enormous benefits to our daily
lives and society, but it also encounters major concerns about security. Security prob-
lems can be solved using standardized security mechanisms such as block ciphers,
hash functions, RSA or elliptic curves; however, these mechanisms are not suitable
for highly constrained IoT devices/sensor nodes with the ultra-low-power feature.
Ultra-low-power devices using battery power supplies or energy harvesting enables
new types of applications such as implant or wearable devices, health monitoring, en-
vironment monitoring with extended operational time. For these constrained devices,
there are trade-offs among security level, hardware cost and throughput. In general,
a high-security level often requires costly hardware and high power consumption.
The feasible solution of security for ultra-low-power devices is to use block ciphers
or lightweight block ciphers to implement various security task such as data encryp-
tion, authentication and identification using pre-shared keys and so on. The recent
proposals for IoT use Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as the main security
primitive for the system such as LoRaWan, Sigfox, Z-wave and so forth. They are
often implemented in hardware accelerators to reduce the power consumption and in-
crease the system throughput because software implementation cannot provide high
throughput and consume the power. However, software implementations of security
functions provide flexibility and configurability because new mechanisms can be im-
plemented into the devices using the software update. On the other hand, hardware
accelerators have fixed designs, and they cannot adapt to new standards and mitigate
new attacks.
Furthermore, different applications might have different security requirements
with different power budgets. Therefore, a configurable solution will adapt better
to a wide range of applications. Conventional block ciphers such as AES can provide
high levels of security while lightweight block ciphers such as PRESENT has smaller
hardware area and lower power consumption. The combination of both types of block
ciphers can help IoT applications lengthen their operations by selecting high levels
of security when there is more stable supply and when in the low power mode, they
can use the lightweight one.
In addition, with the new advancement of memory technologies, In-Memory Com-
puting can be used to implement various security primitives in place without the
requirement of moving the data out of the memory. This not only provides high
flexibility and high configurability but also reduces the risks of exposing secret data
through the system bus. However, this new mechanism needs thorough investigations
and evaluations.
With a view to improve the current situation, this work first and foremost con-
centrates on the power/energy consumption optimization of block ciphers which can
be used to implement different security primitives to secure the data and communi-
cation in IoT systems. The power consumption of both conventional and lightweight
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algorithms will be carefully evaluated. Then, the work proposes a low-power im-
plementation of two standardized algorithms which can be used for ultra-low-power
IoT devices. The first one, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), is a conventional
algorithm widely used to secure the Internet applications with high levels of security.
The other is PRESENT, a new lightweight algorithm which uses hardware constructs
to reduce the hardware area and the power consumption. On the other hand, IoT de-
vices might have different security requirement depending on the applications and the
available power/energy budget. Therefore, in the next step, this work combines the
two modules, AES and PRESENT, into a crypto-accelerator with various key sizes
and block sizes. IoT applications can choose the high secure algorithm with more
power consumption or in the critical condition the lightweight one to lengthen their
operations. Not only optimizing the power consumption, but the security evaluation
using the current state-of-the-art methods are also applied to the proposed design.
Two notable evaluation methods are employed in this work including Correlation
Power Analysis (CPA) and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA). TVLA can ad-
dress different information leakage in the proposed designs while CPA can be used to
mount the key recovery attack. Last but not least, from the lesson of various security
breaches because of the fixed hardware security module, this work finally explores the
configurability, the flexibility and the feasibility of different block cipher algorithms
using In-Memory Computing. This work puts forward the implementation of two
algorithms, which are previously designed in the aforementioned crypto-accelerator,
using the In-Memory Computing technology to explore the trade-offs of the flexibility
and the configurability along with throughput and power/energy consumption.
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Chapter 2
State-of-the-art of security hardware in IoT
Simple cryptography algorithms have been used for a long time to protect private and
confidential information such as military or diplomatic communications. For exam-
ple, Enigma Machine used by German Army during the World War II was equipped
with an electro-mechanical rotary cipher which was said to be very hard to break by
humans at that time because of an extremely large number of combinations. However,
as a result of the development of computer machines, it was then broken by a machine
designed by Alan Turing. With the help of the machine designed by Alan Turing,
British military was able to read the encrypted messages transmitted by the German.
This shows the danger of transmitting secret information in a public environment.
In the era of the connected world, information is transmitted over the Internet and
cryptography is becoming increasingly important to protect the information secrecy
and integrity. Nevertheless, multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in ciphers
such as Data Encryption Standards (DES) [Biham1990dcd, Matsui1994lcm] or RC4
[Mantin2005pad] which were used in the GSM (Global System for Mobile commu-
nication) network. Therefore, to reduce the risks of using weak algorithms, new
applications should use well-studied and standardized algorithms. This is why Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) is chosen as the main security primitive in the
recent IoT proposals.
However, conventional algorithms with strong security levels such as AES are
often designed for software implementation with optimization for software. They
have been implemented in hardware to increase performance, and they need to be
optimized for hardware cost and power consumption, but they have larger area and
higher power consumption compared with the new lightweight cryptography algo-
rithms which are designed specifically for hardware implementation. Lightweight
algorithms such as PRESENT were designed with the trade-offs among hardware
cost, power consumption and security. They are more efficient in hardware than in
software and sometimes with reduced security levels to reduce the hardware cost and
area power consumption.
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To optimize the security functions for IoT, block ciphers and lightweight block ci-
phers are often implemented in hardware to reduce the cost and power consumption.
However, these optimizations lead to the fixed hardware structures which cannot
adapt to new standards and mitigate new attacks. To improve flexibility, many algo-
rithms can be combined into a configurable architecture. Different optimizations can
be applied to reduce the hardware cost and power consumption. However, flexibility
and configurability still have to trade off for high power consumption.
To push one step further, In-Memory Computing and Near-Memory Computing
can be deployed to improve the flexibility and configurability of block-cipher imple-
mentations. In-Memory Computing provides logical operations and storage while
Near-Memory Computing puts the operations closer to the memory. Therefore, the
power consumption caused by the communication overheads of transferring data from
the memory to IP cores or processing elements the communication overheads can be
saved. However, because of the serial operations of the memory, it often requires a
large number of clock cycles than in the case of fixed hardware.
This chapter aims to review the recent works on designs of cryptography algo-
rithms and their hardware implementations for constrained devices. It discusses vari-
ous techniques to implement the block ciphers in hardware for performance, area and
power consumption. It also summarizes various optimization techniques using emerg-
ing technologies such as In-Memory Computing, Near-Memory Computing, Domain
Wall Nano Wires, and so on. Importantly, it summaries the current state-of-the-art
of hardware implementations of various cryptography algorithms.
Based on the above analyses, this work then proposes its own crypto-accelerator
for ultra-low-power consumption which will be discussed in details in Chapter 3. How-
ever, the crypto-accelerator has limited configurable options and flexibility. There-
fore, flexibility and configurability are further explored in Chapter 4 using In-Memory
Computing. The same algorithms in Chapter 3 are demonstrated in Chapter 4 to ex-
plore the trade-offs among flexibility, configurability, throughput and power/energy
consumption.
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, the hardware architectures of sym-
metric cryptography algorithms, especially the block ciphers and the power con-
sumption optimizations for CMOS technologies are presented in Section 2.1. Both
conventional algorithms and new lightweight algorithms are discussed. After that, the
current state-of-the-art of hardware implementations of AES and various lightweight
cryptography algorithms, including power optimization is shown in Section 2.2 and
Section 2.3, respectively. This chapter then discusses existing reconfigurable hardware
implementations of cryptography algorithms in Section 2.4. It includes the previous
works on In-Memory Computing and Near-Memory Computing. Section 2.5 presents
various accelerations using memory elements and the trade-offs between flexibility
and configurability with throughput and power consumption. The hardware secu-
rity including the hardware evaluation methods is described in Section 2.6. Finally,
24
Section 2.7 presents some conclusions and perspectives on the state-of-the-art.
2.1 Introduction to symmetric cryptography hardware
architecture and its power consumption optimiza-
tions
This section firstly assesses the current designs of various symmetric cryptography
algorithms and their hardware architectures. There is no specific method to design a
highly secure block cipher. However, there are some agreed secure primitives and/or
operations which have been used to design most of the symmetric cryptography
algorithms. After that, the optimization techniques which can be applied to the
hardware design of these algorithms will be discussed.
2.1.1 Symmetric cryptography hardware architecture
Symmetric cryptography algorithms are cipher algorithms which require both the
sender and the receiver to share the same key. The sender will use the key to encrypt
the data while the receiver will use it to decrypt the encrypted data. Symmetric
cryptography contains block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block ciphers work on fixed
width bit vectors. For example, Data Encryption Standard (DES) has the block size
of 56 bits, while Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has the block size of 128 bits.
The encryption is carried out by transforming the data blocks using permutations and
some linear/non-linear transformations. On the other hand, stream ciphers generate
a pseudo-random bit stream. The encryption is performed by XORing the plaintext
with the generated pseudo-random bit stream. The general structure of a stream
cipher is presented in Figure 2.1. To keep the algorithm secure, stream ciphers often
require an initialization vector (IV) and an initialization process before generating
the pseudo-random key stream. The advantage of stream ciphers is that they can
generate a random value very fast. However, stream ciphers are only limited to
stream data and cannot be used in other modes of operations.
Intialization Pseudo-Random Number Generator
Plaintext
Key
Init Vector Ciphertext
Figure 2.1: Stream cipher structure.
Block ciphers work on fixed-size blocks of data and apply different transformations
including linear and non-linear ones to diffuse the input data. Block ciphers and hash
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function define round functions which are repeated with different keys to keep it
secure. Figure 2.2 shows the general structure of block ciphers. Each round contains
non-linear layers and linear permutation. The non-linear substitution layers are often
constructed using a look-up table (S-Box). The permutation layers are often the
permutations of bytes or bits. It may contain other linear arithmetic operations.
The speed of block ciphers is often decided by the speed of its primitive operation
such as the substitution boxes (S-Boxes), the linear operations and the number of
rounds. The more rounds are executed, the more secure the algorithms are. However,
the performance will be degraded. In general, block ciphers are slower in speed when
compared with stream ciphers. However, block ciphers can be used for different
purposes using the operation modes such as Message Authentication Code (MAC)
– a lightweight version of hash functions, or as a stream cipher in counter mode
or Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Figure 2.3 shows the possible modes of
operation of block ciphers to be used as a stream cipher or a message authentication
code. These configurations are adapted in a lightweight protocol such as Counter
with CBC-MAC (CCM) used in LoRaWan [LoRaWan].
Non-Linear 
Substitution
Linear 
PermutationPlaintext
Round Function
Key Key update
CiphertextBlock size
/
Key size
/
/
Block size
Block size
/
Key size
/
Figure 2.2: Block cipher structure.
Block cipher
Key
Message
fixed-size tag
Block 
cipher
Plaintext
Key
Counter
Ciphertext
(a) Block cipher in counter mode (similar to stream cipher)
(b) Block cipher in feedback mode (similar to hash function)
Figure 2.3: Block cipher in different operation modes.
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When personal computers became popular, block cipher algorithms were mostly
designed for software implementation on computers such as Advanced Encryption
Standard which was designed to be efficiently executed on modern computers. How-
ever, the rapid development of many constrained systems such as smart cards or the
power harvesting devices makes it necessary to develop a new class of lightweight
block ciphers. The design of lightweight block ciphers is similar to the traditional
algorithms, but with the optimization for hardware implementation. For example, to
reduce the hardware cost, the lightweight block ciphers often reduce the block size
and the key size. This reduces the security level but more importantly, it reduces
the hardware size and power consumption. The permutation layers use the hardware
permutation which is the permutation of wire in the circuit. Instead of large S-Boxes
in traditional algorithms, lightweight algorithms use 4-bit S-Boxes which can easily
be represented in combinational logic or use a small look-up table. New lightweight
block ciphers are friendly to hardware implementation, but they are not efficient in
software because they use many bit-level operations which take more time to complete
when implemented in software.
Among a large number of block ciphers, in this work, two standardized algorithms
are selected for evaluation. The first one is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
which was designed for efficient software implementation on personal computers.
The other is PRESENT – a recent lightweight cryptography algorithm targeting
constrained devices such as smart cards and embedded systems.
In summary, new advances in cryptography enable a new class of cryptography for
constrained devices which is called lightweight cryptography. Most recent lightweight
cryptography algorithms focus on optimizing the implementation area (hardware
cost) and power consumption, while the throughput is degraded. Despite no specific
guidance according to the recently-announced algorithms, lightweight cryptography
has been designed with lightweight primitives such as small S-Boxes, reduced key size
and reduced block size. Lightweight cryptography provides decent security level and
might be broken in the future. On the other hand, AES is still a strong algorithm and
recommended for many applications. It provides from medium to long-term security
level. However, its complexity makes it not suitable for constrained devices because
of hardware cost and especially the high power and energy consumption.
2.1.2 Power consumption optimizations for CMOS technologies
CMOS technologies replaced previous technologies such as bipolar ones because they
can provide faster switching rates with lower power consumption. The current in-
tegrated circuits are mostly fabricated in CMOS technologies. This section presents
the power consumption characteristics for CMOS technologies which will be used to
understand more clearly the different power consumption optimization techniques in
the following sections.
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In a CMOS circuit, total power consumption is the sum of dynamic power con-
sumption Pdynamic and static power consumption Pstatic as in Equation 2.1. Dynamic
power consumption is caused by charging and discharging load capacitances when
gates switch or by the short circuit current when both NMOS and PMOS are in the
open state (Equation 2.2). Switching power consumption is related to load capac-
itance (C), supply voltage (V DD) and operating frequency (f) of the circuit as in
Equation 2.3. On the other hand, static power consumption is caused by the sub-
threshold leakage through the OFF transistor; gate leakage through gate dielectric;
junction leakage through source/drain diffusion; and contention current in ratioed
circuits (Equation 2.4).
Ptotal = Pdynamic + Pstatic (2.1)
Pdynamic = Pswitching + Pshort−circuit (2.2)
Pswitching = α× C × V
2
V DD × f (2.3)
Pstatic = (Isubthreshold + Igate + Ijunction + Icontention)× VV DD (2.4)
Power consumption can also be divided into different categories. Active power is
the power consumption of the circuit when it does something helpful. At the idle
time, the circuit can be put into the standby mode to reduce its power consumption.
This is called the standby power. When in the standby mode for a long time, the
circuit can also be switched into the sleep state so that it would consume even less
power, which is called the sleep power. Active power is dominated by dynamic
power consumption while standby power consumption is dominated by the leakage.
To optimize the power consumption during the active state, it is more important
to optimize the dynamic power consumption. The leakage power should also be
minimized during the standby and sleep state because the circuit does not do helpful
works.
Various techniques can be applied to minimize the power consumption of a CMOS
circuit. Power optimization can be performed from architecture levels down to fabri-
cation process. For dynamic power consumption, the focus is on the switching power
consumption. As described in Equation 2.3, switching power is related to the load
capacitance, supply voltage and operating frequency. Reducing the supply voltage
has a high impact on power consumption because switching power has a quadratic
relation with supply voltage. However, reducing the supply voltage might affect the
performance of the circuit because at lower supply voltage, the transistors in the
circuit switch slower and they are more susceptible to noise. For this area, there is
a new trend in near-threshold operations range of CMOS circuit. Reducing supply
voltage also affects the maximum operating frequency (f) of the circuit. Furthermore,
the operating frequency can also be controlled to give enough performance with re-
duced power consumption. In addition, voltage and frequency can be controlled
together to give better performance. Methods such as Dynamic Voltage Frequency
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Scaling (DVFS) [LeSueur2010dvf] or Adaptive Voltage Frequency Scaling (AVFS)
[Beigne2011ail] are widely applied in the current products. At the microarchitecture
level, clock-gating is one of the efficient ways to reduce the dynamic power consump-
tion because it reduces the switching activity of the clock distribution network. The
idea of clock gating is to cut off the clock signals connected to sequential elements
when they are not activated. New EDA tools support the insertion of an integrated
clock gating (ICG) cells to registers with an enable signal [Benini1994spb]. At the
microarchitecture level, minimizing the glitches of the circuit can also help to reduce
the power consumption. Glitches are created because of the different propagation
delays.
To optimize the leakage power during the idle state of the circuit, power gating
is widely used. If the circuit is idle for a long enough period, the power distribution
to the circuit will be cut off. As a result, the circuit will consume little power
because there is a tiny static power consumption and no dynamic power consumption.
However, power gating needs careful controls and consideration so that the circuit
will work correctly after being powered on again. State retention can be used to
maintain the state of the circuit during the power cut-off. The working states will
be restored when the circuit is powered on. Due to the state retention and isolation,
power-on and power-off sequences takes time and have to be activated carefully.
Therefore, power gating is only effective when the power is cut off in a long period.
Bad controls of power-on and power-off sequences might leads to the increase of power
and energy consumption. Other techniques can also be applied such as using multiple
threshold voltage transistors (multi-Vth), Reserve/Forward Back-Biasing (RBB/FBB)
[Pagliari2018fbb] and optimization in the fabrication process.
In summary, optimizing power consumption of integrated circuits is important for
constrained devices. There are multiple methods to optimize different aspects of the
circuit. The optimization at the architecture level often has the most impact on the
results.
2.2 AES hardware implementation
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a round-based block cipher with the block
size of 128 bits supporting the key size of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits with 10
rounds, 12 rounds and 14 rounds, respectively. It has been standardized in 2001 under
the name FIPS-197 by U.S National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST)
[FIPS-197] and then included in ISO/IEC 18033-3 [ISO-18033-3]. AES encryption
procedure is shown in Figure 2.4. Firstly, the 128-bit data block is divided into 16
bytes and arranged into a matrix of 4×4 bytes so called the state matrix. All AES
operations work on this state matrix. There are four basic operations in a round of
AES encryption datapath including AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows, and Mix-
Columns. AddRoundkey step is the XOR of the state matrix with the 128-bit round
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Figure 2.4: AES encryption algorithm in details.
key. SubBytes transform the state matrix byte-by-byte using a non-linear mapping
function. This function can be used as a look-up table (LUT) or by using arith-
metic in the finite field GF(28) and an affine transformation. ShiftRows transform
the state matrix by rows. Each row is rotated by a different number of bytes while
MixColumns transform the state matrix by its columns. In these steps, only Sub-
Bytes contain non-linear operations while the other steps are linear operations. Each
round needs a different round key generated by the key expansion algorithm. The
key expansion is composed of three operations: RotWords, SubWords, and XORs.
SubBytes and SubWords are similar because they both implement S-box operations,
while RotWord is similar to ShiftRow operation. RotWords and SubWords are only
applied to the first word in the key matrix. For AES with 256-bit keys, an additional
SubWords is added for the fifth word in the key matrix.
Recently, in the wake of information security issues, various works have been
tapped into optimizing AES for various purposes. The most notable efforts into
optimizing area and power/energy consumption of AES are summarized in Figure
2.5. The areas of these works are normalized using the number of 2-input NAND
gate equivalence (GE) while the energy consumption utilizes the notation of en-
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ergy per bit which is the required energy to processing a bit of data. The energy
per bit is calculated by dividing the total energy required to process a data block
by the block size. For high-speed applications such as optical links or high-speed
networks, AES is implemented in hardware with the round-based implementation
[Liu2011A2G] or pipeline architecture [Mathew20115GN] or unrolled-round archi-
tecture [Maene2015sio]. On the one hand, these kinds of architectures can provide
gigabits of throughput, they, on the other hand, require high power consumption
which is not suitable for embedded systems or constrained devices. For examples, in
[Mathew20115GN], Mathew et al. present a two-stage pipeline architecture which can
provide a throughput of 53Gbps with the power consumption of 125mW . Neverthe-
less, these designs often consume more than 15,000 2-input NAND Gate Equivalences
(GEs) to hundreds of thousand GEs. The biggest part of the parallel architectures is
the S-box. In round-based architecture, there are 16 S-boxes for the encryption path
and 4 S-Boxes for the key expansion. In this case, the S-boxes may occupy half of the
total area. Round-based architectures often require 10 cycles/encryption; unrolled
implementations take from 1 to 5 cycles/encryption while pipeline architectures can
complete the encryption of a block in one cycle after the pipeline is fulfilled.
Most existing designs for low-cost and low-power AES focus on 8-bit datapaths.
8-bit datapath designs can reduce hardware implementation area significantly with
the cost of reducing throughput as they use one [Mathew20153m1, Wamser2017ptl]
or two S-boxes [Zhao2015nsa, Moradi2011ptl]. The theoretical limit of 8-bit datapath
is 160 cycles/encryption. Extreme small designs such as in [Mathew20153m1] and
[Moradi2011ptl] require more than 200 cycles/encryption. The activities in 8-bit
datapath are reduced since there are only 8 bits processed in a clock cycle with the
cost of additional registers for MixColumns and additional gates for control logic.
The additional registers for MixColumns are required because MixColumns work on
4-byte column data which are available only when the whole column is processed. To
achieve medium and high throughput, 8-bit datapath architectures have to run at a
high frequency up to GHz.
Moreover, the authors in [Jean2017bag] put AES hardware implementation to
another extreme by using the bit-sliding technique. By using a 1-bit datapath ar-
chitecture, they reduce the hardware cost of AES down to 1500 GEs. However, this
architecture takes an extremely long time to finish one encryption (up to 1700 cycles).
They also explore other options for implementing AES algorithms using bit-sliding
techniques. The 8-bit datapath presented in their work is close to the current state-
of-the-art. Bit-sliding technique can be applied to other algorithms which use the
Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) as AES or PRESENT.
The further area reduction for 8-bit datapath is done by optimizing the S-box.
In the AES standard, the straightforward implementation of the S-box is to use a
look-up table (LUT). However, LUT-based implementations require large area foot-
print. Moreover, AES standard [FIPS-197] also describes AES S-box as an invertible
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Figure 2.5: State-of-the-art of hardware implementations of AES.
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non-linear function in the finite field. The first step is to find the multiplicative in-
verse of the input byte in GF(28). In the second step, an affine transformation in
GF(2) is applied to the output in the first step. Many works tried to optimize S-box
further by using equivalent representations of S-Box such as the tower field which
is the decomposition of GF(28) into GF(((22)2)2) [Canright2005AVC, Satoh2001acr].
This can reduce the area of S-box to about 290GEs/S-box while the LUT-based im-
plementations require at least 400GEs/S-box. Another decomposition of GF(28) is
to use the normal basis of GF((24)2) as in [Mathew20153m1]. These methods reduce
the size of the S-box, but the unbalanced datapath of the S-boxes introduces more
activities. In [Bertoni2004PAS], Bertoni et al. present a method to synthesize the S-
box for low power by using the Decode-Switch-Encode method. It can achieve lower
power consumption but requires more area than the previous methods.
Another option in optimization is to use 32-bit datapath. AES algorithm is de-
signed for software implementation in modern computers with 32-bit instruction set
architectures. Therefore, AES in 32-bit datapath has some advantages. The number
of S-box is reduced, instead of 20 S-boxes in round-based architectures; 32-bit dat-
apath uses only four S-boxes (in case of sharing the S-box between the encryption
path and the key expansion) or 8 S-boxes (without sharing). The number of cycles
required for one encryption is about 44 to 54 cycles [Satoh2001acr], at least 4 times
higher than 8-bit architectures. 32-bit datapath architectures also use fewer registers
than 8-bit datapath because the MixColumn step may have data of the whole column
in one clock cycle. This opens an opportunity to optimize the architecture further
for area, throughput, and power/energy efficiency.
2.3 Lightweight cryptography implementation
One of the applications with mandatory security requirement is RFID tag, although it
is a small electronic card with power supply harvested from the reader. Therefore, it is
considered as the first highly-constrained devices. The development of RFID tags also
affects security trends. In particular, traditional security functions which require a
large hardware area and high power consumption are no longer suitable for RFID Tag.
To overcome this limitation, a new class of cryptography algorithms called lightweight
cryptography was brought into play. It focuses on scaling down the hardware area
and power consumption but with a reduced security level. To be more precise, many
algorithms decrease the key size and the block size to reduce hardware area and power
consumption, but this will reduce the security level. The block size is commonly
seen ranging from 48 bits to 64 bits, for example, SIMON [Beaulieu2013tsa], TWINE
[Suzaki2011tal], KATAN [Canniere2009kak], KLIEN [Gong2012kan] and so on. Some
others come in 128-bit block size such as CLEFIA [Shirai2007t1b]. The key size is
also reduced between 80 bits to 128 bits in order to maintain a decent security level.
Smaller block size and smaller key size will help to reduce the hardware area, as a
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consequence of the use of fewer registers to store the data and the key. Additionally,
such reduction can help cut down on the power consumption to the respect that the
dynamic power consumption is related to the activity of the registers and the static
power consumption is related to its area. Another notable point is that lightweight
block ciphers use hardware structure for permutation and smaller S-box in comparison
with a traditional algorithm such as AES. However, to maintain the proper security
level, lightweight cryptography requires a larger number of rounds which reduces the
system throughput when running at the same frequency. Figure 2.6 reveals the area
and the throughput of different cryptography algorithms. It is clear from Figure 2.6
that many lightweight cryptography algorithms result in smaller hardware area, but
they generate very low throughput.
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Figure 2.6: Area vs throughput of various cryptography algorithms.
Take the lightweight block cipher– PRESENT for example. PRESENT
[Bogdanov2007pau] is a recently-standardized block cipher for constrained designs.
In contrast to AES which uses byte level operations, PRESENT uses hardware
friendly primitives to save hardware cost and power consumption. Figure 2.7 shows
the PRESENT algorithm. To save hardware area, PRESENT uses an 80-bit key
and 64-bit block size. Its extended version supports 128-bit key with the same block
size. PRESENT uses 4-bit S-Boxes for the substitution layer instead of 8-bit
S-Boxes as in AES. Furthermore, despite complex linear operations such as
ShiftRows and MixColumns in AES, PRESENT uses only bit permutations for
permutation layer. This can be done by wire permutation in hardware. However,
because of its simple operations, PRESENT needs up to 32 rounds to keep it
unbreakable on the algorithmic level within a reasonable time.
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Figure 2.7: The PRESENT algorithm.
Among these algorithms, PRESENT and Clefia are standardized for lightweight
block ciphers to be used in RFID application [ISO-29167-1] and lightweight block
cipher [ISO-29192-2]. In addition, Grain and Trivium are selected as the standardized
stream ciphers. Clefia supports multiple key sizes and block sizes similar to AES. It
has high throughput but occupies a large area. Clefia, Grain and Trivium indicated
smaller hardware area than the implementations of AES at the publication time of
the ISO standard. However, running for the hardware implementation area, recent
researches such as the work by Mathew et al. in [Mathew20153m1] show that AES
encryption can also be implemented using about 2K GEs.
Along with the race for the area and power consumption, there are also al-
gorithms which focus on optimizing the throughput. For example, PRINCE in
[Borghoff2012pal] was designed to maximize its throughput with small hardware area
and low power consumption. It was reported in [Borghoff2012pal] to occupied only
3.5K GEs, but has throughput up to 530kbps compared to AES (with only 8kbps
of throughput with the same area). PRINCE has high throughput because it was
designed for a fully-unrolled architecture to be implemented using a smaller area.
Therefore, it can encrypt a block per clock cycle but with longer datapath delay as
a trade-off. The unrolling technique can also be applied to other block ciphers to
achieve high throughput but with larger area footprint and higher power consump-
tion.
Lightweight cryptography might have low power consumption; however, it may
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Figure 2.8: Dynamic power consumption vs Energy per bit of different cryptography
algorithms.
consume a large amount of energy. Figure 2.8 shows the dynamic power consumption
and the energy per bit of different hardware implementations of the traditional block
cipher AES and some lightweight cryptography algorithms. Obviously, lightweight
cryptography algorithms have low dynamic power consumption, but they are not
efficient in terms of energy consumption. Theoretically, energy is related to the
power consumption and the time that the chip consumes that power. However,
lightweight block ciphers require a large number of rounds to keep its design security
level which leads to low throughput and high energy consumption. In addition,
energy consumption is becoming important for battery-based applications. Therefore,
to optimize the energy consumption, both power consumption and the execution
time must be optimized. For constrained devices, the power consumption has to
meet the demands of the power budget while the throughput must be maximized.
From Figure 2.8, AES can have good power and energy balance. Furthermore, some
lightweight cryptography implementations can achieve lower power consumption, but
they consume higher energy because of lower throughput.
Most of the early designed lightweight cryptography algorithms use hardware
friendly structure to optimize the hardware area; however, they are not optimized
for software implementation. Structures such as bit permutations or 4-bit S-boxes
needs multiple instructions in software. Along with a large number of rounds, these
lightweight cryptography algorithms have poor performance in software. This creates
36
the needs for lightweight algorithms which can run fast on both software and hard-
ware. SPECK and SIMON [Beaulieu2013tsa] are designed with this idea. The au-
thors claim the performance of 1.32 cycles/byte on Intel Processor [Beaulieu2015tsa].
With the development of new encryption methods such as homomorphic encryp-
tion [Brakerski2012fhe], calculations can be done in the encrypted domain. Two basic
operations in the encrypted domain are the multiplication (logical AND) and the ad-
dition (logical XOR). Addition can be done easily, but multiplication in homomorphic
encryption is complicated. Therefore, there are some algorithms focusing on reduc-
ing the multiplication depth so that it can be used more efficiently in homomorphic
encryption [Canteaut2016sca, Albrecht2015cfm].
In summary, under tight requirements of constrained devices in terms of hardware
area and power consumption, lightweight cryptography has been developed to reduce
the hardware area and power consumption. However, they are observed not to be
suitable for software implementation because of their hardware-specific structures.
The area and power consumption are scaled down by reducing the security level with
a smaller block size and a smaller key size, then applying the low-cost transform in
hardware. Recently, other requirements have been taken into account, such as maxi-
mizing the throughput in both software and hardware or reducing the AND depth for
homomorphic encryption. One of the areas which are not yet the focus of the current
lightweight algorithms is to optimize for power/energy consumption. Different appli-
cations might have different requirements for throughput, power/energy budget and
hardware area. Thus, finding the balance among these factors is one of the targets
of this work.
2.4 Configurable hardware cryptography implementa-
tion
Security requirements vary among different applications which drive many works to
focus on configurable hardware cryptography. Configurable cryptography modules
implement multiple cryptography accelerators or multiple cryptography primitives
so that they can be configured at run-time. This provides flexibility, but it increases
the hardware cost and also the power consumption because the security primitives
or accelerators must be included to be used when necessary. Even when they are not
used, they might still consume power.
For example, Hutter et al. in [Hutter2011acp] proposed a configurable cryptogra-
phy processor which supports both asymmetric algorithms and symmetric ones. This
design uses an 8-bit microprocessor along with two accelerators. One accelerator is
used for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and the other is for AES. The archi-
tecture of this work is shown in Figure 2.9. It uses a microcontroller to manipulate
a microcode ROM to control the two crypto-accelerator cores. The authors claim it
as a low-cost solution with the area of 21 KGEs. Among them, AES acceleration
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part occupies about 2.5 KGEs. In terms of throughput, this architecture takes more
than 4500 cycles to finish one encryption.
Figure 2.9: Reconfigurable crypto-processor using microcontroller and accelerators
[Hutter2011acp].
A more generic way to design the configurable cryptography processor is to include
all the individual primitives so that they can be composed into different algorithms.
Sayilar and Chiou in [Sayilar2014cht] follow this direction. They design a processing
element (PE) consisting of five configurable function units including Arithmetic Unit
(AU), Logical Operation Unit (LOU), Table Lookup Unit (TLU), Shifter-Rotator
Unit (SRU), and Permutation-Expansion Unit. The proposed system consists of an
array of PEs connecting from one layer to another using a crossbar called connection
row. By using this system, different cryptographic algorithms including AES, MD5,
SHA-1, SHA-2, and stream ciphers such as RC4, RC5 and Phelix can be mapped into
different PEs automatically or manually. AES implementation of this architecture
takes 20 clock cycles to finish one encryption. The drawbacks of this architecture are
high area cost of more than 6mm2 and high power consumption of nearly 1W/mm2.
Multiple algorithms with similar transformations can be grouped to create a re-
configurable module such as the work by Satpathy et al. [Satpathy2018grg]. This
work implements three block ciphers including AES and SM4, and Camellia by using
the common transformations of these algorithms in GF((24)2). By using a hybrid
S-boxes with shared inversion, affine scaling for MixcColumns of AES, Polynomial
optimization, and key pre-computation, the authors can reduce the area by nearly
30 percent in comparison with the separate implementations. The design has been
fabricated using 14nm technology with the power consumption of AES of 16µW at
0.24V@2.1MHz.
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In addition, a configurable crypto-accelerator using In-Memory-Computing and
near-memory computing was proposed by Zhang et al. in [Zhang2018rar]. Figure 2.10
demonstrates their architecture with S-boxes, a bit rotators, a shifter along with a
special memory which can perform logical operations such as XOR. This architecture
supports AES, ECC and Keccak-f function (which is the SHA-3) [Bertoni2011tks].
For AES, the S-Box is designed in native GF((24)2) with registers inserted before the
inversion to reduce the glitches of the S-Box circuit. The authors claimed 80% runtime
and energy savings when compared with their baseline processor architectures. In
detail, AES needs 726 clock cycles to finish one encryption and 7.2nJ energy per bit.
Figure 2.10: Configurable accelerator using In-Memory-Computing and Near-
Memory computing by Zhang et al. in [Zhang2018rar].
In summary, configurable cryptography modules provide more flexible solutions
than specific cryptography modules. Depending on the applications’ requirements,
different security mechanisms can be used with larger hardware area to exchange for
flexibility. The drawback of these works is that they occupy a large area and consumes
huge power consumption. These systems are typically in the class of nJ energy per
bit, while the specific crypto-accelerators of AES often consume some of pJ . Due to
high power consumption and cost, these systems are not yet suitable for constrained
IoT system. In addition, In-Memory Computing and Near-Memory Computing show
their potential to be applied to cryptography systems. It is because they can process
the data near or in the memory which reduces the cost of transmitting data to the
processor or the crypto-accelerators and concurrently reduces the risk of exposing the
secret data through the system bus. Furthermore, the memory can also do parallel
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operations not only with 32-bit or 64-bit as the processor, but also 512 bits. This
opens a new research direction for future applications.
2.5 Encryption using memory elements
SRAM memory is widely used in electronics chips as a storage element. It has a high
speed of operations and is one of the important parts of SoC architectures. SRAM
even occupies most of the space of the chip as a cache memory to store temporary
data and to prefetch instructions and data for faster access. SRAM can also be used
as a look-up element. From early days, there have been ideas on implementing the S-
Boxes using SRAM or a special type of SRAM such as Content Addressable Memory
(CAM). For example, Labbe et al. [Labbe2004ehi] designed AES crypto-accelerator
using SRAM elements to do fast S-Boxes look-up. Furthermore, Hua Li [Li2005anc]
uses CAM as a way to implement S-Boxes and inverse S-Boxes. These works use
SRAM in its pure form without any modification of the memory structure to do logic
in memory.
New advances in semiconductors enable the discovery of new material for design-
ing SRAM. For examples, Abid et al. in [Abid2009ecg] use new materials to design
SRAM and use it to do cryptography. They used CMOL gate design to design an
AES encryption core. After that, in 2016, Wang et al. [Wang2016dad] use Domain
Wall Nanowire to design SRAM with the capability of doing shift operations and
XOR operations. The authors use this new memory to design different operations of
AES. Theoretically, the composed components of this type of memory into different
AES sub-blocks can be used to build the whole AES encryption. However, this work
is based on pure simulation.
2.6 Hardware Security
Another threat to constrained IoT applications lies in hardware attacks. Even though
the algorithm is proved to be secure, its implementation in hardware or software
potentially contains flaws which lead to different types of attacks such as fault attacks,
timing attacks, side-channel attacks and so forth. The exploration of Differential
Power Attack (DPA) [Kocher1999dpa] by Kocher et al. has shown that the microchips
unintentionally leak information when they process it. This opens a new research area
to protect the system from these types of attacks. Integrating the countermeasures
of these types of attacks will raise not only the cost, but also the power consumption.
The hardware security can be divided into different categories including hardware
trojans [Dupuis2018pah], reverse engineering of hardware components and informa-
tion which it stores, and side-channel attacks. Hardware trojans have become the
new issues of highly-integrated System-on-Chip because IP cores are now designed by
different vendors that can intentionally insert trojans which are set to be activated
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when having enough conditions. For cryptographic devices, hardware trojans might
be used to take out the secret keys. In addition, reverse engineering of hardware com-
ponents can also be used to extract helpful information. Key stored in the memory
or non-volatile elements might be extracted using this method. More importantly,
side-channel attacks employ other types of information from the chip such as volt-
age, current or power consumption to attack the cryptography algorithm. This work
focuses on side-channel attacks which can be used to mount key extraction attacks.
Side-channel information could be any forms of physical information emitted by
the microchip. This physical information is one part of the physical characteris-
tics of the chip. Two popular side-channels include power consumption of the chip
[Kocher1999dpa] and electromagnetic emission (EM) [Agrawal2003tes]. Power con-
sumption and EM captured from a device are related to the chips activities. When
applied to cryptographic chips, this instantaneous power consumption or EM are di-
rectly related to the chip operations which contains the operations with the secret
key. Therefore, power or EM traces can be extracted using the current state-of-the-art
attacks.
The current semiconductor technologies use CMOS transistors to build the func-
tional circuit. These transistors have different levels of power leakage during their
operations. The leakage is related to the current state or the function that it performs
and it is called the state dependent leakage which is directly related to the secret key
of cryptographic algorithms. By measuring power consumption of the circuit, the
secret key can be extracted if enough data is collected.
Power analysis attacks are divided into different categories including Simple
Power Analysis (SPA) [Kocher1999dpa], Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
[Kocher1999dpa], Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [Brier2004cpa], and Template
Attack [Chari2003ta]. SPA is a simple method which guesses the secret key directly
from the power traces. SPA is often used for asymmetric cryptography when the
serial operation is used. The secret key can be guessed directly from the power
trace. However, in real hardware, the computations are often performed in parallel
and there are many noises which leads to a low success rate of SPA in practice. In
contrast, DPA and CPA use differential function and correlation estimation function
respectively to evaluate a set of guesses. The guesses with the highest score might
be the correct key. CPA is one of the most effective methods at the moment. For
template attacks, the attacker must have full control of a sample device to create a
template for the attacks. Numerous power traces must be collected, and the
template attack will characterize the system. After characterization, the attack can
be mounted with a few power traces. Template attacks need more preparation steps
than DPA or CPA, but it is also a powerful method because the victim’s secret key
can be found with fewer power traces after characterization.
Figure 2.11 demonstrates the attack flow of Power Analysis Attacks. Instead of
brute forcing the key, the attack can focus on a certain byte at a time. This reduces
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the total number of key guesses. At first, an intermediate value in the algorithm is
selected for attack. The intermediate value can be the output of any steps in the
algorithm. After that, a hypothesis consisting of all the guesses can be calculated
using a power model. After that, the hypothesis can be correlated and compared with
the real power traces. The one which has the highest correlation can be the correct
guess. This reduces the search space and can reduce the time to find the correct key.
For a software implementation on 8-bit micro-controller, a key can be revealed using
some hundreds of traces. Power model which is often used in the power analysis
attack is Hamming Distance which is related to the activity of the key-dependent
operation. Pearson Correlation function is often used as the statistical tool for this
analysis.
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Figure 2.11: Power analysis attacks.
Furthermore, key-dependent leakage can be addressed faster using statistical tests
such as Student T-Test [Student1908tpe] or a more general version – Welch T-Test
[Welch1947tgo]. These tests perform the statistical analysis of the power traces
to find the distinguishable data points in the power traces. The calculation of
T-Test is faster than DPA and CPA. Therefore, the leakage can be found earlier
[Schneider2015lam]. However, the leakage found by T-Test might not lead to key
42
recovery attacks [Schneider2015lam].
To generalize the testing methods for cryptographic devices, Test Vector Leakage
Assessment (TVLA) [Goodwill2011atm] has been proposed as a generalized method
to help designers identify the leakage. This method proposes procedures to evalu-
ate the designs including the key generation for the test, the plaintext generation
and the trace processing. The statistical test used is Welch T-Test. There are two
kinds of TVLA tests including non-specific tests and specific tests. In non-specific
tests, the encryption of the same inputs is performed repeatedly. Then, the captured
power traces are divided into two groups. If the T-Test scores of the two groups
are larger than 4.5 or smaller than -4.5 at the same point in time, the test fails and
the design might leak important information which can be used to reveal the secret
key using power analysis attacks. In specific tests, TVLA also defines a set of tests
on different steps of the algorithms such as the statistical test of the S-Box output
(SOUT), the inputs and outputs of each round (RIRO), the specific bytes of each
round (ROUT BYTE0) and so on. There is a total of 896 tests per round. The power
traces are captured with a predefined key and data with the output of the current
test being used as the input of the next test. The power traces are also divided into
two groups as in the non-specific test. The test fails when the T-Test scores of the
two groups are larger than 4.5 or smaller than -4.5 at the same point in time. The
design is not qualified when at least one of the tests fails. T-Test can be performed
much faster than mounting DPA and CPA attacks. It can also be used to evaluate
the high order leakages such as the work in [Schneider2015lam]. In addition, TVLA
can also be linked to the attack success rate [Roy2016lmi].
This work performed CPA and TVLA on the power estimated traces of the
crypto-accelerator designs to ensure that the power optimization techniques applied
to the crypto-accelerator do not introduce new leakages. There are other statistical
methods, which are alternatives to TVLA, such as Analysis of Variant (ANOVA) or
Normalized Inter-Class Variant (NICV) [Bhasin2014nicv, Moradi2014dhl]. However,
these methods are not considered in this work.
2.7 Conclusion
Security concerns for IoT systems are rising rapidly along with their vast range of ap-
plications. Therefore, implementing security mechanisms for IoT devices, especially
highly-constrained devices, need careful consideration. For these devices, a new class
of cryptography algorithms called lightweight cryptography has been developed to
save the hardware cost and reduce power consumption. However, they might have
barely acceptable security levels and a margin of lower energy consumption. Ultra-
low-power operations are crucial to many applications which do not have a stable
power supply such as the power harvesting devices. Lightweight cryptography al-
gorithms standardized by ISO/IEC for different applications are available, but they
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have not been used yet for IoT applications.
Moreover, new IoT proposals have been adopting AES as the main security mech-
anism. Therefore, optimization for AES in terms of area, throughput and especially
power/energy consumption is becoming increasingly important. Current implemen-
tations of AES for low power consumption is focusing on 8-bit datapath designs with
one S-box which reduces the system throughput and increase the energy consump-
tion. 8-bit datapath with one S-box has small hardware area because of the small
area footprint of one S-box, but they need extra registers to store the intermediate
results for the MixColumns calculations. In addition, different implementations of
S-boxes have different hardware area and different power consumption. This opens
the need for optimizing the S-boxes for the trade-off among hardware area, power
consumption, and energy consumption.
Furthermore, different applications are subject to various security requirements
and power/energy budgets. Therefore, a configurable solution is needed to adapt to
various applications. In particular, lightweight block ciphers and conventional block
ciphers can be combined to create a flexible solution with low power consumption.
In addition, the trade-offs among area, throughput and power/energy consumption
are challenging to achieve at the same times. It even becomes more challenging when
flexibility and configurability are added.
Despite the low power consumption of these implementations, their fixed struc-
tures cannot adapt to new standards and mitigate new threats. New capabilities are
added, while new attacks and threats are discovered. Therefore, flexibility and con-
figurability of security primitives need attention. In-Memory Computing and Near-
Memory Computing are innovative methods to implement flexible security functions.
Because of the serial operations of the memory, flexibility and configurability are
traded off with throughput and power consumption.
In addition to that, hardware security which uses side-channel information as an
attack vector is bringing more and more threats to new IoT devices. Side-channel
attacks can be used to reveal the secret key of the system. Countermeasures to these
attacks are costly and often not included in the design for ultra-low-power devices.
Based on the current state-of-the-art of hardware implementations of various block
ciphers, this work proposes a low-power implementation of two standardized algo-
rithms which can be used for ultra-low-power IoT devices. The first one, AES, is a
conventional algorithm widely used to secure Internet applications with high levels of
security. The other is PRESENT, a new lightweight algorithm which uses hardware
constructs to reduce the hardware area and the power consumption. In the next
step, this work combines the two modules, AES and PRESENT, into a configurable
crypto-accelerator with various key sizes, block sizes, and security levels. Not only
the power consumption is optimized, but the security evaluation using the current
state-of-the-art methods are also applied to the proposed design to ensure that low-
power optimization does not introduce new information leakages. Finally, this work
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explores the configurability, the flexibility and the feasibility of different block cipher
algorithms using In-Memory Computing. The next chapter will present the work on
the power optimization of block ciphers including AES and PRESENT for IoT and
our configurable crypto-accelerator in SNACk testchip.
45

Chapter 3
Proposed crypto-accelerator for
ultra-low-power IoT
New IoT applications such as implant and wearable appliance, healthcare monitor-
ing, and environment monitoring need to be implemented in ultra-low-power devices
with small hardware area. Furthermore, secret data might be collected, processed
and transmitted in the IoT network. Therefore, it is crucial to equip IoT applica-
tions with security functions to protect confidentiality and authentication. However,
security functions may reduce the system throughput and increase the power con-
sumption, because extra functions are required for their execution. This brings into
play the requirements to optimize the security functions for throughput, cost, and
power consumption.
In addition, different applications are characterized with diverse security require-
ments, depending on the type of secret data they manipulate. Applications which
require long-term security should use strong cryptography algorithms such as AES
with 256-bit keys, while lightweight applications can use lightweight cryptography
to reduce the power consumption. Security primitives with different configurations,
which can adapt to various applications’ needs, can provide the flexibility for appli-
cation development.
Ultra-low-power consumption solutions can be provided by the hardware imple-
mentation of security functions using block ciphers and lightweight block ciphers
with serial architectures. Serial processing helps improve the power consumption.
However, it increases the overall system latency and energy consumption. There-
fore, trade-offs among security levels, throughput, hardware costs and power/energy
consumption should be studied thoroughly.
The recent IoT proposals have been using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
as the main security mechanism to protect the data confidentiality because AES
has been proved to provide long-term security. Therefore, optimizations for AES are
important not only for IoT applications but also for a wide range of other applications
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which use AES. However, AES has been considered to be a conventional cryptography
algorithm with high power consumption even when it is implemented on hardware.
On the other hands, for ultra-low-power applications, lightweight cryptography such
as PRESENT might also be applied to further reduce the power consumption by
using hardware friendly constructs, but this reduction has to be traded off with a low
security level and throughput.
In addition, optimizations, for instance, power optimization might cause hardware
security issues. Attacks using side-channel information especially power analysis at-
tacks can be mounted easily. Therefore, security evaluation for the optimized security
module needs careful consideration. Methods such as Correlational Power Analysis
and Test Vector Leakage Assessment might be used to evaluate the possibility to
mount the key recovery attacks and to address the different leakages of the hardware
modules.
In this chapter, a multi-standard hardware crypto-accelerator with multiple se-
curity levels covering from lightweight security up to very long-term security with
optimization for power/energy consumption is proposed. It contains two standard-
ized encryption algorithms: AES [FIPS-197] and PRESENT [Bogdanov2007pau].
AES, which is widely used in current IoT proposals, provides high levels of security
with high throughput; while PRESENT, a lightweight block cipher, encrypts data
at extremely low power consumption. This crypto-accelerator has a 32-bit data in-
terface with configurable parameters. It is up to the application to decide which
algorithm, with which key size and number of rounds to use. The AES module was
designed with 32-bit datapath to save the implementation area while the PRESENT
module has 64-bit datapath to maximize its throughput. Among other means, the
hardware area of the two designs is saved by doing key expansion on-the-fly. AES
power consumption is further optimized by a low power implementation of the sub-
stitution boxes (S-boxes), and by gating the inputs of S-boxes in the key expansion
when they are not used to reduce the switching activities. This crypto-accelerator was
implemented in the 28nm FD-SOI technology of STMicroelectronics with 11K gates
equivalent (GEs) in total and throughput up to 170Mbps. At 10MHz@0.6V@25oC,
our design provides a throughput between 17Mbps and 28Mbps while consuming less
than 20µW on average, and its energy per bit is less than 1pJ/bit. Furthermore, this
proposal does not focus on countermeasures to side-channel attacks but the security
evaluation, using Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Test Vector Leakage As-
sessment (TVLA), has been performed on the proposed design. The key recovery
attacks using CPA and the test score in TVLA show that the proposal has equiv-
alent information leakage when compared with an unprotected reference design on
OpenCores. Thus, this accelerator is suitable for a wide range of ultra-low-power and
ultra-low-energy applications in IoT sensor nodes.
This chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.1 provides a short introduction to
AES and PRESENT in the proposal. Section 3.2 presents the architecture of the
48
proposed AES including all the optimizations performed on AES. PRESENT archi-
tecture is shown in Section 3.3. After that, the two block ciphers are combined into a
block cipher module with 32-bit data interfaces and implemented in SNACk testchip.
The estimation and measurement results of SNACk testchip are demonstrated in Sec-
tion 3.4. Then, the security evaluation based on the power trace generated from the
post-signoff netlist is presented in Section 3.5. This section also includes the detail
explanations of the trace processing framework to prepare the power traces for the
evaluation. Finally, some conclusions and perspectives are raised in Section 3.6.
3.1 Introduction
IoT applications might require various security profiles with different power/energy
budgets. A configurable crypto-accelerators with different power/energy profiles can
provide a flexible solution for a wide range of IoT applications. This chapter presents
a crypto-accelerator with a widely used cryptography standard core – AES and a
lightweight cryptography core – PRESENT. Two IP cores are implemented into the
cryptography kernel in SNACk testchip for evaluation. AES is selected because it
provides long-term security and has broadly been used as the main security mecha-
nism for new IoT proposals, even though it occupies a large hardware area and has
high power consumption than lightweight algorithms. Meanwhile, PRESENT is one
of the new lightweight cryptography algorithms which use the hardware construct to
reduce the hardware cost and minimize the power consumption.
The proposed AES encryption core uses 32-bit datapath supporting multiple se-
curity levels from 128-bit key up to 256-bit key. In addition, power optimization
is applied at the hardware architecture level to minimize the power consumption.
Hardware area is also optimized to reduce the hardware cost. The datapath of our
proposed AES was designed to minimize the switching activities, consequently to
save power consumption. In the AES algorithm, in each round, the certain order of
transformations can be changed without the impact on the output of the algorithm.
For example, the order of ShiftRows and SubBytes can be changed without changing
the output of the algorithm. For the design of AES, we rearranged the order of these
steps in order to achieve the best efficiency in terms of power, energy and throughput.
Our AES encryption architecture supports all the key sizes specified in AES standard
[FIPS-197].
At the same time, our proposed PRESENT encryption core uses a full parallel
architecture with 64-bit datapath to increase throughput since our PRESENT core
is a round-based encryption core which requires 32 rounds to do an encryption. Even
in this configuration, PRESENT still shows some advantages over AES with small
hardware size and low power consumption. However, PRESENT in software has
some drawbacks because of its hardware-friendly constructs in bit-based operations.
In the following sections, the full hardware architectures of the proposed AES and
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PRESENT will be presented. Two algorithms are integrated into a crypto-accelerator
with a 32-bit data interface. The crypto-accelerator is implemented using FD-SOI
28nm technology in SNACk testchip. The implementation results and the power
consumption measurement will be discussed in the following sections.
3.2 Proposed AES architecture
AES supports multiple key sizes to allow multiple levels of security ranging from
midterm security with 128-bit keys to long-term one with 256-bit keys. Furthermore,
in a non-standard way, the reduced rounds of AES can also be used to increase the
throughput and reduce energy consumption. For examples, the best theoretical attack
on a 5-round AES requires 222.25 chosen plaintexts, a memory of 220 blocks of 128 bits,
and computation time of 222.5 encryption [Achiya2018ikr]. A lightweight application,
which does not use up to this bound, can use the reduced-round AES to minimize
the energy consumption. Consequently, this work implements a configurable AES
encryption module with different configurations of key sizes and also support reduced-
round AES. The proposed architecture is presented in Figure 3.1. The encryption
path includes four parts: a state register, 4 S-boxes, a MixColumn, and an output
register which also acts as a temporary register to store intermediate results. The key
expansion consists of two key registers and a key transformation module to support
all key sizes specified in AES. This design is a 32-bit datapath architecture which
means the input data and the input key are divided into 32-bit chunks. Each pair of
32-bit data and 32-bit key is loaded together. This takes 4 cycles to load the 128-bit
key and 128-bit data and XOR them into the state register. For 192-bit keys and
256-bit keys, after the first 128 bits are loaded, the encryption is started while the
other bits of the key are continuously loaded to maximize the throughput. There
are two feedback paths, one in the key expansion and the other in the encryption
path. The state register needs to be updated every four cycles with new 128-bit data
while the previously expanded word is sent back to the key registers to generate the
new expanded key. The details of the optimizations in our proposed architecture are
presented in the next subsections.
3.2.1 32-bit datapath optimizations
To reduce area and power consumption in the datapath, this work minimizes the
number of flip-flops and control logic in the datapath by using shift registers with
a special organization. Shift registers help to simplify loading data and loading key
steps. 32 bits of both plaintext and key are loaded at the same time into the state
register and the key register by using shift operations. By minimizing the number of
flip-flops, this work also reduces the number of clock buffers and power consumption
of the clock tree because clock buffers in the clock tree consume a large amount of
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Figure 3.2: Our proposed state register.
results are written out from the output register. In the 128-bit key configuration, AES
encryption module needs 10 rounds, which leads to 40 cycles to finish the encryption
for a 128-bit block of data. The total number of cycles to encrypt a block in this
architecture is 44 cycles. For other key configurations, our architecture needs 52
cycles and 60 cycles to encrypt a data block for 192-bit key mode and 256-bit key
mode, respectively.
Figure 3.3: Our proposed output register.
Clock gating technique is applied on the stage register and the output register
separately to save the dynamic power consumption. For examples, in data loading
state, the clock to the output register is disabled to save power because there are
no valid data to the output register. Furthermore, when in the inactive state, the
output of these registers is not changed, which means that there is no activity in the
encryption path. The power estimation results using the post-placement-and-routing
netlist show that even in the highest throughput mode (44 cycles/encryption for 128-
bit key mode) the applied clock gating technique can save more than 13% of power.
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Certainly, with smaller throughput, the clock gating technique can even save much
more power consumption.
3.2.2 Substitution box (S-box)
The substitution box (S-box) has a significant impact on area and power consumption
of the AES design. This architecture chooses S-box implementation for achieving the
lowest power consumption. S-boxes may occupy up to 60% of the total cell area,
and consume about 10%- 30% of the total power consumption [Hamalainen2006dai].
The smallest implementation of S-boxes has up to present been attained by Canright
[Canright2005AVC]. Canright S-box demonstrates an optimized area (292 gates/S-
box) but needs more power/energy consumption because it creates more activities,
especially in architectures with 8 S-boxes. The most popular and straight-forward
S-box implementation is the LUT-based S-box. LUT-based S-box is bigger in terms
of area (434 gates/S-box) but consumes less power/energy than Canright S-box.
The most efficient S-box in terms of power consumption is Decode-Switch-Encode
(DSE) S-box; however, it occupies a larger area. DSE S-box can be further op-
timized for power consumption using the structure proposed by Bertoni et al. in
[Bertoni2004PAS] and described in Figure 3.4. The idea is to use a onehot decoder
to convert S-box inputs into onehot representation. In this scheme, the input is repre-
sented using a group of bits where there is only one bit ‘1’ and all the others ‘0’. The
non-linear operations are performed using wire permutation as in lightweight cryp-
tography algorithms. After that, the S-box output in onehot encoding is converted
back into the original field.
Decode-Switch-Encode S-Box can reduce the power consumption because it min-
imizes the activity inside the S-box circuit. After decoding state, only one signal
changes its value to go to the encoding state. Most of the area lost is because of the
size of encoder and decoder circuits. This optimization leads to 10% power reduction
to the whole design. The synthesized DSE S-Box in this work has the size of 466
GEs/S-box which is 7% increase in size in comparison with LUT-based S-Box or 1.6
times the size of the smallest S-boxes. The S-Boxes in our design consume only 10%
of the total power consumption.
3.2.3 Key expansion optimizations
The key expansion applys the same mechanism as in the encryption path with further
optimizations for S-boxes and loading data into the key registers for different key
sizes. Also, the power consumption is saved by masking the S-Box inputs with
constant values when not being used to save the dynamic power consumption. To
save the hardware area and to improve the system throughput, the expanded key is
calculated on-the-fly and fed back directly to the key registers and the encryption
path. To support three sizes of keys in AES, the key expansion module consists of
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Figure 3.4: Our Decode-Switch-Encode (DSE) S-Box.
two 4×4-stage shift registers which support storing and expanding of 128-bit keys,
192-bit keys and 256-bit keys. The key transform module includes four S-boxes, and
an XOR to do key expansions for all key modes.
The structure of the two registers is presented in Figure 3.5. For 128-bit key
mode, only the first shift register is used, at the same time, the clock signal to the
second shift register is disabled to save power. For 192-bit key mode, the first shift
registers and a half of the second shift register are used, while for 256-bit key mode,
both shift registers are used. The last expanded word of the key expansion output is
sent back into the first key register to continue generating the round key. Depending
on the key size, the last word may need to be transformed using RotWord, SubWord
and XOR with RCON, a round constant, before being added with other key words.
In 128-bit key mode, these three operations are applied to the last word every 4 clock
cycles while in 192-bit key mode and 256-bit key mode, they are applied every 6
clock cycles and 8 clock cycles, respectively. 256-bit key mode needs one additional
SubWord in the middle of 8 clock cycles. The second key register generates two
different key modes which are 192-bit key mode and 256-bit key mode. In 128-bit
key mode, the second key register is disabled while the output of the first key register
is selected to XOR with the output from the key transform module. In 192-bit key
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Figure 3.6: Key transform.
3.3 Proposed PRESENT architecture
Similar to AES, PRESENT has been designed with multiple security levels support-
ing from decent security levels with 80-bit keys to the midterm security of 128-bit
keys. The reduced-round version of PRESENT [Cho2009lco] can be used to improve
throughput and minimize power consumption. Therefore, the proposed PRESENT
module is designed with different modes of keys and various number of rounds. The
proposed PRESENT architecture is presented in Figure 3.7. This architecture is a
straight-forward implementation from PRESENT specification which supports both
80-bit key and 128-bit key. Therefore, in this work, the two key modes are combined in
a configurable module with various number of rounds to allow multiple power/energy
consumption profiles. The input plaintext and key are 32-bit data interface. There-
fore, loading 64-bit blocks will take two clock cycles, whereas loading keys needs
extra clock cycles: 3-clock cycles for 80-bit keys and 4 clock cycles for 128-bit keys.
Similar to AES architecture, keys and input data blocks are loaded together so that
the addition of key and data can be done immediately. To reduce the hardware area,
the intermediate results are stored directly back to the state registers. The key ex-
tension also uses shift registers to store the expanded key. PRESENT use only 4-bit
S-Boxes, therefore, they are designed as combinational logic. The permutation is the
wire permutation. As a result, they cost fewer logic gates. All the control logics are
based on a single round counter and the key configuration.
To optimize the power consumption, the shift registers are clock gated using an
enable signal. When the shift registers in the idle state, the clock is disconnected
from the clock network to save power consumption. The S-boxes are optimized using
combinational logic. The S-Boxes are used in all steps; therefore, they are not masked
as in the case of AES. With this configuration, the proposed PRESENT core takes
37 clock cycles and 38 clock cycles to finish encrypting one 64-bit data block for
80-bit keys and 128-bit key, respectively. In comparison with the proposed AES
architecture, PRESENT core uses 2.5 times fewer registers than the ones in AES
56


VD
D
4
G
ND
E2
GN
D
4
Test FSM & configs
FLL
VD
D
_
NO
CP
ER
F1
SP
I_
SS
_
CR
YP
TO
_
N
C
RY
PT
O
_
RU
NN
IN
G
_
O
VD
D
E2
VD
D
_
CR
YP
TO
GN
D
3
VD
D
3
FL
L_
FR
EQ
_
OU
T_
0
VD
D
_
CF
G_
1
CL
K_
I
GND7
VDD7
SPI_MOSI_I
SPI_SCLK_I
VDD_FLL
SPI_SS_ASN_N_I
Crypto. kernel
GNDE1
RESETN_I
SPI_MISO_O
GND8
VDD6
VDD_NOCPERF2
VDDE1
VDD_CFG2
GND5
VDD5
VD
D
_
NO
CP
ER
F3
VD
D
_
AS
N
GN
D
6
VD
D
8
GN
D
E1
VD
D
GN
D
VD
D
GN
D
BG
CO
N
VD
D
_
CF
G3
VDD1
GND1
VDD_CFG4
VDD2
VDD0
GND2
GND0
VDD_NOCPERF3
VDD9
GND9
Figure 3.10: SNACk testchip’s layout.
the stop signal through the SPI interface. The final layout of SNACk testchip is
shown in Figure 3.10. An on-chip Frequency-Locked Loop (FLL) is used to generate
different frequencies for the test. The FLL is also programmed through the SPI
interface. All the power estimation results in the next subsection are obtained using
this test configuration using the post-signoff extraction of the layout in Figure 3.10.
3.4.2 Power estimation results
To evaluate the performance and the power consumption of the proposed architec-
tures using the test environment of SNACk chip, two encryption cores are tested with
different key lengths at different supply voltages and different operating frequencies.
The same key and the plaintexts are sent to each encryption module. Concurrently,
the activity of the post-signoff timing simulation for each encryption module is cap-
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Figure 3.15: SNACk test setup with the oscilloscope.
sured by measuring the supply voltage and the current through this pin. Figure 3.16
shows the power consumption of AES and PRESENT measured at 10MHz at the
room temperature. The supply voltage varies from 0.4V up to 1.3V which is a larger
range than the one in the power estimation setup. This is because the standard-cell
libraries used in the power estimation are only characterized for the working condi-
tion down to 0.6V . At 0.4V , the testchip can still work at 10MHz and consumes a
power of less than 20µW . In the worst case at 1.3V , AES has a power consumption
of 180µW , while PRESENT only spends more than 100µW . There is a small margin
in terms of power consumption between AES with 192-bit keys and AES with 256-bit
keys. Figure 3.17 shows the leakage power at various supply voltages. This leakage
power consumption is measured by turning off the clock generator and the circuit is
in the idle state without any activities of the block cipher modules. The two modules
are not separated by different power domain during the implementation. Therefore,
the result is the sum of the leakage of both AES and PRESENT. It is clear from this
figure that the worse case of the static leakage is at 1.3V with 40µW . In addition,
Figure 3.18 shows that the power consumption increases linearly with the operating
frequency.
The measured energy per bit of AES with 128-bit keys is illustrated in Figure 3.19.
Obviously, the AES module with 128-bit keys consumes a small energy of 0.4pJ/bit
at the supply voltage of 0.4V and with a throughput of 28Mbps. With the same
condition, PRESENT consumes an energy of 0.3pJ/bit but with a throughput of
17Mbps. At the highest throughput of 2Gbps, the proposed AES consume 2.2pJ/bit.
Our proposed crypto-accelerator can achieve very low power consumption with high
throughput at the subthreshold supply voltage of 0.4V .
The proposed architecture shows dominant performance compared to the state
of the art which is illustrated in Figure 3.20 and Table 3.1. From the area point
of view, the proposed AES architecture with only 128-bit key is 1.5 times bigger
than the design in [Zhao2015nsa] in the same technology node, and four times big-
ger than the design in [Mathew20153m1]. However, our design has four times more
throughput than the design in [Zhao2015nsa] and about eight times more throughput
than the design in [Mathew20153m1] at the same operating frequency. In compari-
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Table 3.1: Comparison with other AES implementations
Design Block
size
(bit)
Key
size
(bit)
Arch.
(data-
path)
Tech.
(nm)
#cycles
per
encrypt-
ion
Area
(kGEs)
Work-
ing
freq.
(MHz)
Power
(µW )
Through-
put
(Mbps)
Energy/bit
(pJ/bit)
The proposed
AES
128 128,
192,
256
32-bit 28 44, 52,
60
8.6 10 24
(0.6V ),
11
(0.4V )
28 0.65
(0.6V ),
0.4 (0.4V )
Banik, SAC’15
[Banik2015EEE]
128 128 32-bit 90 44 5.5 10 - 28 6.2
Zhang,
VLSI-C’16
[Zhang2016AC4]
128 128 8-bit 40 337 2.2 122 100
(0.45V )
46.2 2.2
(0.45V )
Zhao, TVLSI’15
[Zhao2015nsa]
128 128 8-bit 65 160 4 32 61.7
(0.6V )
25.6 2.3 (0.6V )
Mathew, JSSC’15
[Mathew20153m1]
128 128 8-bit 22 336 1.947 76 170
(0.34V)
29 5.6
(0.34V )
Liu, ESSCIRC’11
[Liu2011A2G]
128 128 128-bit 90 10 15 255 5,990 2.99Gbps 2.0
Mathew, JSSC’11
[Mathew20115GN]
128 128,
192,
256
2-stage
pipeline
45 5,6,7 100 31 409
(0.34V )
800 0.511
(0.34V )
Satpathy,
VLSI’18
[Satpathy2018grg]
128 128 8 S-
boxes
(recon-
fig.)
14 25 54 620
(0.75V ),
2.4
(0.24V )
26.1mW
(0.75V ),
15.6
(0.24V )
3.1Gbps
(0.75V ),
2.4(0.24V )
8 (0.75V ),
1.3
(0.24V )
son with the same 32-bit datapath, according to our optimization, our architecture
achieves 20% improvement in power consumption in TSMC 65nm compared with the
work in [Banik2015EEE] with a small increase in terms of gate counts. However, the
work in [Banik2015EEE] does not provide the information about how they got these
results. If their result comes from a post-synthesis estimation, it is less accurate
than the proposed results because the power estimation result is based on para-
sitic values which are sometimes not available or not accurate at the post-synthesis
stage. At the same throughput of about 28Mbps, our architecture consumes the
least power (24µW@0.6V ) when compared with the 8-bit datapath designs such as
in [Zhao2015nsa, Mathew20153m1, Zhang2016AC4]. At this throughput, our pro-
posed architecture has about three times less power consumption than the best 8-bit
datapath design for low-power and low-energy in [Zhao2015nsa]. In terms of en-
ergy efficiency, our design consumes the least energy per bit among the low-cost de-
signs [Liu2011A2G, Mathew20153m1, Zhao2015nsa, Zhang2016AC4, Banik2015EEE]
with only 0.65pJ/bit (@0.6V@25oC); and approaches the energy per bit of the high-
performance design in [Mathew20115GN] (0.511pJ/bit@409µW@0.34V ). Comparing
with the work in [Satpathy2018grg] using 14nm technology and a configurable ar-
chitecture for three symmetric ciphers, the block cipher modules in AES still have
advantages in term of power and energy consumption. At the supply voltage of 0.4V ,
the configurable cryptography kernel in SNACk testchip still consumes a power con-
sumption of 11µW less than the one in [Satpathy2018grg].
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Figure 3.20: Comparison with other low-cost AES implementations.
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3.5 Security Evaluation
Hardware security has become a critical issue over the last few years. However, adding
countermeasure to the chip not only takes time but also increase power consumption
and cost. The main purpose of this work is to investigate the low power features
for IoT. For this reason, no countermeasure was integrated into its design. However,
the security evaluation was completed by using the current state-of-the-art methods
including Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks and Test Vector Leakage As-
sessment (TVLA) method based on the post-signoff power-trace extraction. Power
traces are obtained by performing power estimation using the technology libraries
with the netlist after implementation. The simulation waveform of the netlist pro-
vides the activities of the design similar to the real condition. This simulates the real
situation when the chip is working. The advantage of this method is that it can be
performed at different stages of the design such as the post-synthesis netlist or post-
place-and-route netlist. The power traces have lower noises when compared with the
real power traces. Optimization techniques can be applied to fasten the calculation
and reduce the storage size such as the compression of the power traces or selecting
only the region of interest. This evaluation can help to identify the flaws early in the
design flows. In addition, it also reduces the design cost because the designers do not
have to wait until the chip is fabricated. The power-trace generation and processing
using power estimation tools will be presented in the next section.
3.5.1 Power trace generation using PrimeTime and Post-signoff
netlist
Hardware security is emerging as a major threat to the IoT systems. Therefore, an
early method to evaluate the security feature at the design stage is implemented.
Accordingly, detailed power traces are extracted from power estimation results us-
ing Primetime with the post-signoff netlist and delay information in Standard Delay
Format (SDF). Figure 3.21 illustrates the design flows to generate the power traces
for evaluation. To begin with, the post-signoff netlist is exported after the place-
ment and route with its SDF. After that, the post-signoff timing simulation is done
using QuestaSim. The timing simulation generates the waveform with real timing
information. This waveform is then used as an input to power estimation.
PrimeTime is employed to do power estimation with full timing information of
each encryption. PrimeTime records the changes at the time that power consumption
is changing. Therefore, interpolation is needed to generate the power traces similar
to the real cases. The alignment of the power traces is also performed so that each
power trace has the same reference point in time. This can be done using the start of
each encryption. Figure 3.22 shows the trace processing steps. Because PrimeTime
only records the power when there is a change in the event, therefore, a zero-order
interpolation filter is applied to get the power traces at each time step. After that,
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the power trace for each encryption is extracted based on the encryption time. Fur-
thermore, in order to reduce the processing time and reduces the size of the traces to
simulate different sampling speed of the trace measurement device, adjacent points
can be added and reduced into only one point in the final power traces. This com-
pression technique is used in our trace processing techniques to reduce the size of the
power traces and fasten the computation. For instance, the power traces of 20,000
encryptions exported by PrimeTime have the size of 22GB in text format, while its
compression using Gzip only occupies 4.7GB. After the Gziped file processed by this
trace processing framework using the interpolation, alignment and trace compression
technique, the trace file, which contains the region of interest, takes 4.6GB of disk
space. The file size can be made smaller by reducing the number of points in the trace
file which is similar to reducing the number of sampling file in a real measurement.
Figure 3.23 illustrates the whole trace processing framework including extracting and
splitting the power traces, interpolating and compressing them and mounting CPA
attacks. This trace processing framework has been validated using the reference de-
sign [Aes128Opencore] which was successfully attacked by this framework to recover
the secret key.
In this work, the physical side-channel attacks are evaluated based on the simu-
lated power traces from a post-signoff design flows. PrimeTime is used to generate
the power traces from the timing simulation and the physical parasitic of the de-
signs. After that, the power traces are interpolated and compressed to simulate
70

the real trace acquisition. This framework has been used in successful attacks on
the implemented designs, therefore, it will be used to generate the power-traces to
evaluate the security features in this work. The security evaluation based on power
analysis using Correlation Power Analysis and Test Vector Leakage Assessment using
this trace-processing framework will be presented in Section 3.5.2 and Section 3.5.3,
respectively.
3.5.2 Test Vector Leakage Assessment evaluation
This work firstly uses Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) [Goodwill2011atm]
method to identify the possible leakages of the proposed cryptographic designs.
TVLA includes two types of tests to evaluate the information leakage using Welch’s
T-Test function. The first one is the non-specific test – a fixed-versus-random test
which compares the T-test score between the power traces of a fixed key and fixed
data encryption and the one of a fixed key and random data encryption. The other
is the specific test which can be used to identify the information leakage at different
steps in a round such as the round output, S-Box output, round input versus round
output, and the leakage at a specific byte. The total number of specific tests is 896
tests per round.
The proposed designs and the reference design on Opencores [Aes128Opencore]
are implemented in the same technology up to signoff. The signoff netlist and delay
information are used to generate 20,000 encryption traces. These power traces are
compressed to extract only the interesting part to do the TVLA evaluation. The
TVLA evaluation is performed on all ten rounds of AES 128-bit key case. This
leads to a total of 8.960 tests of specific tests. Figure 3.24 presents the number of
test failures for each category of the proposed design and the design on OpenCores
[Aes128Opencore]. Obviously, the two designs have different leakages. The proposed
design has the weakness in ROUT and SOUT test while the design on OpenCores
shows strong leakages in RIRO, ROUT and SOUT. In addition, The proposed design
does not have any test fails in ROUT BYTE0 and ROUTE BYTE1 tests. However,
the reference design on OpenCores shows a few test failures. In general, the proposed
design has 21 test failures fewer than the reference design.
In addition, the non-specific tests are also performed on the two designs. 10.000
power traces of fixed data and fixed key encryption are generated for the proposed
design and the reference design. After that, they are divided into two groups to
calculate the T-test scores. Figure 3.25 and Figure 3.26 shows the absolute T-test
scores of this test for the proposed designs and the reference design, respectively. It is
clear from these figures that the two designs do not pass the non-specific test because
there is no countermeasure implemented in the two designs. In terms of T-test
scores, the reference design has five times bigger in T-test scores than the proposed
design. The power traces used in this test is generated using the post-signoff power
estimation. Hence, some real conditions are not considered. For example, there is no
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Figure 3.24: TVLA evaluation results of the specific test of the proposed design
versus the design on Opencores [Aes128Opencore].
clock jitter in this case, so, the power traces are perfectly aligned. In a real system,
a noise created by the running components or from the clock source, the noise from
the power supply and so forth might make the T-Test score much lower than this
theoretical case.
All things considered, the security evaluation using TVLA method was performed
on the proposed design and a reference design from OpenCores. The evaluation re-
sults show that our design was exposed to some of the attacks especially in the
Round-Out (ROUT) tests and the S-box-Out (SOUT) tests. While the reference
design has the weakness in Round-In Round-Out (RIRO) tests, SOUT tests, and
ROUT tests. For non-specific test, our design shows five times lower than the ref-
erence design in terms of the T-test scores. Regarding TVLA results, the security
levels of the optimized design are equivalent to the reference design. It means that
the optimizations do not introduce new leakages.
3.5.3 Correlation Power Analysis attacks on estimated traces
TVLA results provide a level of confidence to conclude that the design has ex-
ploitable leakages. However, it might not lead to a successful key-recovery attack
[Schneider2015lam]. Therefore, this work also performs Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) attack, a key-recovery attack, to verify that the proposed optimizations do
not introduce any new leakage. The attack is based on the power traces extracted
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Figure 3.27: Number of correct guessed key bytes (in 128-bit key mode) by last-round
CPA attack.
from different vendors, therefore, they may monitor the bus, and expose the data
to accelerate the attacks. IP cores containing hardware trojans are becoming new
threats in IoT system because IoT might contain many IP cores from different ven-
dors. Moreover, hardware trojans are hard to be detected.
In summary, the proposed design firstly focuses on optimizing area, throughput
and power/energy consumption of the data encryption module, i.e., the block cipher
module in SNACk testchip. As the design of countermeasures is a different area of
research, this work does not consider the countermeasures for different attacks such
as fault attacks or side-channel attacks. Regarding the TVLA and CPA results, the
proposed architecture has certain resistance to correlation power analysis attacks.
Our experiment shows that only 12 bytes are revealed when mounting correlation
power analysis attacks on the designs. At the system points of view, there exists a
threat of data movements along the system bus, which can be monitored by hardware
trojans from third-party IP cores. These problems can be solved by using a new
mechanism to implement cryptography. In-Memory Computing is a new promising
solution in this case. Countermeasures such as masking and hiding techniques can be
easily implemented using In-Memory Computing by executing multiple operations
at the same time. Because of the regularity of the memory, these countermeasures
might increase the security features of the IoT system at no extra cost.
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3.6 Conclusion
Current ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost security solutions for IoT security usually
come along with using block ciphers as the main security primitives. Block cipher
is one of the deterministic components in a secure system and can be configured
to perform different modes of operations. However, block cipher consumes a large
amount of power. To minimize the power consumption as well as the hardware cost,
lightweight cryptography has been chosen with a reduction in the security level by
using small block size, small key size and a large number of rounds. This leads to a
reduction in the throughput of the system.
On the other hand, recent IoT proposals have been continuing using AES as the
main security primitives because of its well-studied security features and performance
in software. Lightweight cryptography such as PRESENT with lower security level
but providing low cost and ultra-low power consumption has not been adopted yet.
Furthermore, depending on the applications’ needs, lightweight security functions
can be selected when ultra-low-power mode is needed to extend their operations.
Strong security can be provided by conventional security functions, while configurable
security solutions can provide flexibility in terms of applications’ points of view.
Various previous works in AES focused on the serial implementation by using 8-
bit datapath and one-S-box architecture. 8-bit datapath architectures can reduce the
hardware cost and power consumption, but it also reduces the system throughput
and increases the energy consumption. 8-bit datapath architecture also requires
additional hardware registers to store the intermediate values. Trade-offs among
security levels, hardware cost, throughput and power/energy consumption must be
considered carefully.
This work proposes a configurable block cipher module with a traditional algo-
rithm AES and a lightweight cryptography algorithm – PRESENT. IoT applications
can select among various options such as key sizes, block sizes and the number of
rounds which corresponds to different security levels and different power/energy con-
sumption profiles. Accordingly, to reduce the hardware area, AES was implemented
with 32-bit datapath architecture and supported with power reduction techniques in
the datapath. Also, a round base architecture is used to maximize the throughput of
PRESENT. The proposed PRESENT architecture has about half of AES dynamic
power consumption.
Furthermore, multiple optimization strategies for AES 32-bit datapath to achieve
a low-cost, high-throughput, ultra-low-power, ultra-low-energy design with multiple
levels of security have been proposed. The area of the proposed AES architecture
is saved by a reorganization of both datapath and key expansion to minimize the
number of registers and control logics. The power consumption is reduced by choos-
ing the S-boxes for low-power, by minimizing the activity in the key expansion and
the datapath, and by applying a clock gating strategy to data storage registers.
The throughput is maximized by using 8 S-boxes and doing key expansion in par-
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allel with the encryption path. Multiple key sizes of the encryption module provide
different security levels which help IoT applications to adapt to a wider range of
security protocols and mechanisms. In terms of power and energy consumption, at
0.6V@25◦C, the proposed AES design can achieve power consumption of less than
20µW for all key configurations with the energy consumption of less than 1pJ/bit
with the throughput of 28Mbps at 10MHz. In this condition, the proposed AES im-
plementation has achieved nearly the same energy consumption in comparison with
the lightweight cryptography algorithm PRESENT on the same technology node –
ST FD-SOI 28nm technology. Nevertheless, this work does not look into the coun-
termeasure for power analysis attack, but the security evaluation is performed on
the AES design to identify the possible weakness in terms of hardware security. The
evaluation results using Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Test Vector Leakage
Assessment (TVLA) show that the optimizations are somewhat beneficial to security
features. In the key recovery attack using CPA methods, only 12 bytes out of 16
bytes of the key are revealed using the last-round key hypothesis. TVLA test results
show that the proposed design has equivalent information leakage when being com-
pared with the reference design on Opencores. The proposed block cipher module
obviously can be used for different applications with different security requirements
for future IoT systems.
On the other hand, the crypto-accelerator approach to design the encryption mod-
ules still embrace a number of weaknesses. For example, countermeasures must be
integrated separately, while countermeasures for one attacks might not be applied to
the others. In addition, the hardware accelerator cannot be changed after production,
therefore, in case of any flaws in the design of the hardware module, the only solu-
tion is to make a replacement with a more secure one. This will increase the cost of
maintaining security and bring about the interruption of the service. This urges the
demand for investigating a new method for an efficient implementation of the cryp-
tography algorithms. In the next chapter, a mapping of the same algorithms will be
explored using a new concept of computing so-called In-Memory Computing. As ear-
lier said, In-Memory Computing can help improve the flexibility and configurability
of the design.
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Chapter 4
Using memory as acceleration for data
encryption
The proposed crypto-accelerator can provide ultra-low-power consumption with con-
figurable capability. With different optimizations as presented in Chapter 3, the block
cipher modules in SNACk testchip have small hardware footprint with ultra-low-
energy consumption. However, these advantages are from the fixed hardware struc-
ture with specific optimizations which cannot be altered after fabrication. Therefore,
specific solutions also reveal certain drawbacks.
To begin with, the crypto-accelerator often has a fixed structure with fixed al-
gorithms to optimize hardware cost and power consumption. However, it is crucial
for IoT standards to evolve to adapt to new security threats and to mitigate new at-
tacks. New cryptanalysis techniques along with newly discovered weaknesses in cryp-
tography algorithms might lead to the exclusion of algorithms out of the standards.
Therefore, flexibility and configurability which are adaptable to new IoT standards
and capable of mitigating new threats are required for future IoT applications.
In addition, systems on chip are threatened by hardware trojans. IoT devices
use highly integrated systems on chip with various IP cores procured from different
vendors. It is possible for a third party IP vendor to insert a hardware trojan into
their IP cores to monitor the system bus for secret information. Moreover, crypto-
accelerators typically read out the data from memory through the system bus before
performing their tasks and writing the data back into the memory. Consequently,
this not only raises a security threat but also creates communication overheads.
Possible solutions to overcome this overhead could be Processing In Memory
(PIM), In-Memory Computing and Near-Memory Computing which can be employed
to implement the security primitives directly in the memory. Processing In Memory
and Near-Memory Computing use the accelerator embedded in the memory con-
troller, hence the proposed crypto-accelerator can also be applicable to them. Mean-
while, In-Memory Computing enables the execution of logical or arithmetic operations
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using the memory array itself. Thus, In-Memory Computing shows big potentials to
implement flexible and configurable security solutions which can map various security
primitives using the memory itself. However, because of the serial operations of the
memory, flexibility and configurability have to be traded off with the system through-
put and power consumption. Further study is required to prove its effectiveness.
This chapter will look into techniques to perform data encryption using In-
Memory Computing to overcome the drawbacks of hardware crypto-accelerators.
Two case studies using the same algorithms as in Chapter 3 are selected to eval-
uate the flexibility, configurability and efficiency of the proposal. All operations of
AES and PRESENT can be accomplished in a new type of memory called Smart-
Mem. SmartMem supports not only the normal memory operations such as reading
and writing but also the logic operations such as AND, OR, NOT, XOR, XNOR and
SHIFT. Using this new kind of memory, encryption can be conducted directly at the
place where the data are stored. Therefore, the data transfer is minimized while the
throughput of the whole system can be improved and the power consumption can
also be reduced.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 gives an introduction to various
benefits of data encryption using memory elements. After that, Section 4.2 describes
the mechanism to do In-Memory Computing which is used to create SmartMem
array. The implementations of AES – a conventional cryptography algorithm, and
PRESENT – a lightweight one are presented in 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes
this chapter along with its perspectives.
4.1 Introduction
In a traditional computer-based system, most of the area of the chip is actually
occupied by cache memories or SRAMs which are used to accelerate the computation
by reducing the data access time and power consumption. However, the processor
has to read the data stored in these memories, then do the calculation and write
back the results into them. Consequently, it creates a huge communication overhead
and wastes power/energy consumption. Recently, with the advances in the design
of memories, SRAM and DRAM memories can be designed so as to execute simple
logical and arithmetic operations on the data directly in the memories or through the
memory controller. This results in a shift in system design mindset as well as brings
benefits to the design of cryptographic modules.
Figure 4.1 summaries different computation architectures for cryptographic mod-
ules. Cryptography in the first box is conducted by software running by a CPU or
a microcontroller. In this scheme, the processing unit needs to read the data from
the memory, do the cryptographic algorithms, then write the data back into the
memory. This simultaneously reduces the system throughput and increases power
consumption to the extents that the processing unit has to wait for the data trans-
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termeasures can also be applied when using in-memory computing. For example, the
independent operations can be randomized so that it will be harder to guess at which
time a certain operation is executed. Even fault tolerant mechanisms can also be
applied. The memory can be designed with error correcting code to detect errors and
replace it by a redundancy cell. This all benefits the in-memory computing especially
in-memory encryption.
Processing in Memory (PIM) has been developed before by embedding the ALU
into the DRAM controller. In this mechanism, the dedicated processing element
is included in the memory controller for calculation. The calculation is completed
by adding dedicated hardware closer to the DRAM where the main data is stored.
The DRAM controller will read the data, do the calculation on them, and write
the results back into DRAM. SmartMem is differentiated from PIM by using In-
Memory Computation which uses SRAM memory as an accelerator for calculation.
With a special design of the memory cell and the IO circuits, the area overhead is
minimized. SmartMem structures can also be used as acceleration for PIM. In the
next section, mechanisms for in-memory computation will be addressed. After that,
these mechanisms will be used to create the Encryption-In-Memory modules.
4.2 Computation In-Memory mechanism and Smart-
Mem
SRAM memory is one of the most common components in a computing system,
however, adding computation into memory is a challenge. The main purpose of
SRAM is to write data into the memory bit cells and read data from them. Memory
is often a full custom design, therefore, adding computation to them might increase
the complexity of the design. However, adding computation to memory has many
advantages. Firstly, it reduces the data bandwidth for the memory IO. The data can
be processed directly in the memory without reading it out of the memory. This will
minimize the power consumption of the system. In addition, it also minimizes the
risks of exposing the secret data when the data are read through the system bus.
In the security view, SRAM memory is more regular than ASIC design. Therefore,
the delays and glitches are less abnormal when compared to ASIC implementation.
This makes it more secure when using the memory elements as the acceleration for
IoT. In-memory computing has more resistance to DPA attacks as claimed by Zhang
et al. in [Zhang2018rar]. A software implementation might need only 20 power
traces to reveal the first byte of the key while the near-memory architecture of Zhang
et al. needs 300 traces to obtain the same key. Nevertheless, memory design can
also be hardened to reduce information leakage, for example, the work presented in
[Rozic2012dsf].
Recently, new ideas have been raised on adding some logical and arithmetic op-
erations to the memory without changing the memory structure very much. For
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example, Jeloka et al. in [Jeloka2016anc] create logic computation using TCAM cells
by modifying the sense amplifiers of the original TCAM memory. In the logic-in-
memory mode, this type of memory is able to do simple logic operations such as
AND or NOR. However, for implementing block cipher in memory we might need
other operations such as XOR and SHIFT. Akyel et al. in [Akyel2016ddr] show a
memory structure which supports multiple operations on each row. In this work, we
use this memory structure as the accelerator for in-memory encryption. This memory
structure is called SmartMem.
A SmartMem bit cell is constructed using traditional 6T SRAM bit cells with
two additional read ports which lead to a 10T SRAM cells. The detailed structure of
the SmartMem bit cells is presented in Figure 4.2. It contains one Write Word-Line
(WWL) and two read word lines including Read Word-line Left (RWL) and Read
Word-line Right (RWR). Reading and writing data are separated using two different
pairs of bit lines. Write Bitline Left (WBL) and Write Bitline Right (WBR) are used
for writing operation of bit cells with the same mechanisms as 6T SRAM; while Read
Bitline Left (RBL) and Read Bitline Right (RBR) are used to read the value stored
in the bit cells. For read operations, RBL and RBR must be precharged first. After
that, depending on the value stored in the 6T cell, RBL and RBR will be pulled
down to ‘0’ or kept at ‘1’. Because of this configuration, RBR reads the value of the
bit cell while RBL reads its inverse.
Figure 4.2: 10T SRAM cell for In-Memory Operation proposed by Akayel et al. in
[Akyel2016ddr].
Writing operation is accomplished by precharging WBL and WBR with the cor-
rect voltage value. After that, the word line is activated. This is the same as writing
operation of 6T SRAM cell. Similarly, reading operation is carried out by precharging
either RBL or RBR then activating the corresponding read wordline RWL or RWR.
However, RBL will read the inverse of the value stored in the bit cells. For in-memory
calculation, we will need to control both read ports.
Figure 4.3 describes the in-memory operation using this type of bit cells. Logic
operations can be performed on the data in the same column of memory. For example,
by performing read operation on both bit cell A and bit cell B using two read ports
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of each cell, different logic results could be obtained. In this example, RBL has the
logic function A NOR B because either A or B stores the logic value ‘1’ will result
in the logic value ‘0’ at the output. In contrast, RBR has the logic function A AND
B because both A and B must store a logical value of ‘1’ to make the RBR stay in
‘1’. Further logic operations can be constructed based on this basic operation. For
example, XOR can be performed by adding a NOR gate between two read bitline
in the peripheral circuits. In [Akyel2016ddr], Akyel et al. use this memory cells
and some additional logics in the peripheral of the memory to perform simple logic
operations and arithmetic operations such as AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR, XNOR,
SHIFT, addition, subtraction and so on. The logic functions can also be performed
on multiple rows. However, in this work, we only focus on mapping of cryptographic
function into the memory, therefore, we only focus on XOR and shift operations. The
XOR operation will be performed on two selected rows of the memory.
Figure 4.3: In-Memory logical computation using 10T SRAM cells.
To use the additional operations of SmartMem, the interface of the traditional
SRAM must be modified to add more control information. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
differences between the traditional SRAM and the SmartMem. The signals in red
are the additional signals to support the smart operations. As can be seen from the
figure, Write Enable (WE) signal is extended into two bits to support four modes:
normal-read, normal-write, smart-read and smart-write. In the smart-read operation,
the contents of multiple memory rows will be read, and the results of the smart
operations on these rows will be obtained at the peripheral circuits of the memory.
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Additionally, in the smart-write operation, the contents of multiple memory rows will
be read at the same time to perform the smart-read operation. After that, the result
of the smart operation will be obtained in the peripheral circuits, and then will be
written back into the memory. The smart operation is specified using the operation-
selection signal (OS). The selection signal (SEL) is used to select different rows of
the memory for the smart operations. The bit width of SEL signal is equal to the
number of rows in the memory. A large number of rows makes the interface of SEL
signal impractical. Therefore, to reduce the number of bits of the interface, the SEL
signal is generated by using the addresses of rows, which will be accessed, and onehot
decoders. The results from the onehot decoders will be ORed together to generate
the SEL signal. Consequently, the inputs to the memory will be the addresses of the
accessed rows passed through onehot decoders and OR together as in Figure 4.5. The
more rows are selected, the more decoders must be added to decode the row address.
This view of the memory is similar to multi-read-port SRAM.
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Figure 4.6: SmartMem structure with detailed blocks.
The detailed block diagram of the SmartMem organization is shown in Figure 4.6.
It contains the similar modules as normal SRAM including bit cell array, address
decoders, wordline drivers, column multiplexers, precharge circuits, write driver and
output IO. SmartMem adds modified circuits for the write driver and the output IO
to support smart operations. The bit cell array uses a 10T SRAM cell with two read
ports and one write port as presented in Figure 4.2. To support for selecting two
rows for smart operations, two additional address lines named SEL1 and SEL2 are
86
added. After decoded into the word line, two addresses are ORed with each other to
form the SEL signal for the smart access. To control the smart operation, a new OS
driver module is added. This module will be in charge of selecting the correct smart
operation.
In summary, different logical and arithmetic operations can be performed with
the special design of the bitcell and the IO circuit to facilitate the In-Memory-
Computation capability. The data movement is reduced on account of the shortened
datapath. Moreover, In-Memory Computing has fewer area overheads than the one
in Processing in Memory because it uses the facilities of the memory to perform the
operations instead of using dedicated hardware as in Processing in Memory. The
next section presents the implementation of AES and PRESENT using the memory
design.
4.3 Implementation of Advanced Encryption Standard
and PRESENT using Encryption in memory
Specific hardware crypto-accelerators can provide ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost
security solutions for IoT applications. However, they are not adaptable to new
standards and mitigate new threats. Flexibility and configurability can be provided
by a generic solution using In-Memory computing. To improve the weakness of
the proposal in Chapter 3, this section presents the implementation of AES and
PRESENT based on the In-Memory Computing mechanisms which were discussed
earlier in Section 4.2. In spite of implementing two algorithms using a specialized
hardware structure, this work utilizes the logic operation performed in the memory
to create a flexible and configurable implementation of the cryptography algorithms.
The memory is different from the ASIC implementation that it has regular structures
with well-defined components. On the other hand, memory is fast at looking-up
operations while it is limited in computation. Therefore, this section will manage to
use an alternative organization of the memory and the logic operations to implement
AES and PRESENT. Accordingly, two algorithms will be transformed to utilize the
advantages of the SmartMem architecture.
4.3.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an algorithm optimized for modern com-
puters with the 32-bit and larger registers. Therefore, it contains operations which
can be performed efficiently using software. Consequently, mapping AES into the
SmartMem requires careful consideration especially with the nonlinear operation of
S-boxes. In addition, SmartMem is similar to normal memory, but it has the capabil-
ity to calculate the logical operations efficiently. As a result, AES operations must be
reorganized and transformed to use the advantage of the SmartMem. Figure 4.7 shows
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State ← plaintext
For r = 1…9:
AddRoundKey(state, Kr-1)
ShiftRows(state)
SubBytes(state)
MixColumns(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k9)
ShiftRows(state)
SubBytes(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k10)
Ciphertext ← state
State ← plaintext
For r = 1…9:
AddRoundKey(state, Kr-1)
ShiftRows(state)
SubBytes&MixColMultiply(State)
XOR(State)
AddRoundKey(State, k9)
ShiftRows(State)
SubByte(State)
AddRoundKey(state, k10)
Ciphertext ← state
Original AES (with the 
rearrangement of operations)
AES for SmartMem
Figure 4.7: AES original algorithm and the one for SmartMem.
the original AES algorithm and its modification for being implemented on SmartMem.
SubBytes and MixColumns are composed into SubBytes&MixColMultiply and fol-
lowed by an XOR because SubBytes and MixColumns multiplications will be merged
together and done by using Look-Up Table (LUT). After that, the results are XORed
to get the equivalent results as the original AES. The LUT can be done easily us-
ing the memory while XOR is supported by SmartMem. The other steps are kept
the same because these operations are supported by the SmartMem. For example,
AddRoudKey is actually XOR operation while ShiftRows can be implemented by
controlling the read and write address.
Furthermore, to generate the Look-up Table for SubBytes and MixColumns, the
MixColumns is decomposed into two steps based on the method proposed by James
A. Muir [Muir2013ato] in Figure 4.8. The output from SubBytes is multiplied with
a metric with different coefficients as in Figure 4.8(a). A new byte is created by
multiplying the output of SubBytes with different coefficients and then XOR them
together. The LUT is generated by multiplying the SubBytes LUT with different
multiplying coefficients. In the XOR step, the results will be combined as in Figure
4.8(b). The LUT values will be stored in the memory to be used as LUT tables.
The proposed organization of the SmartMem for implementing AES encryption
is illustrated in Figure 4.9. The memory is composed of four small memories with
8-bit width. Each memory will store a copy of the LUT generated in the previous
steps. The encryption controller will manage the address of each memory. Each
memory contains the LUTs for Subbytes&MulcolMultiply. Four LUTs for Sub-
ytes&MulcolMultiply occupied 1024 words of each memory bank. The expanded
keys could be reused by being generated in advance and being stored in the memory.
This occupies 160 bytes in total and 40 bytes for each memory bank. Therefore,
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--------------------------------------------                                 
(a) Original MixColumns in AES
(b) MixColumns Table-Lookup construction for In-Memory Operation
Figure 4.8: MixColumns for AES using SmartMem based on the method described
in [Muir2013ato].
each memory bank has the size of 2048 words to store the LUTs, expanded keys,
plaintexts, ciphertexts and temporary data. Table 4.3 summarizes the number of
memories needed to store the LUTs, the expanded key, the S-boxes and the state.
More than 2KB can be used to store plaintexts and ciphertexts.
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Figure 4.9: SmartMem organization for AES 32-bit encryption.
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Table 4.1: Memory size to store the expanded key, look-up table for SubBytes and
Mixcolumns of 32-bit datapath architecture
Name Quantity Size (byte) Total size (byte)
Key storage (expanded key) 11 16 176
S-Box&MixcolMultiply table 4×4 256 4096
S-Box table 4 256 1024
Total 5296
Remaining for users’ data 2896
At the startup phase, the LUTs and the expanded key will be written into each
memory. After that, the plaintexts can be written into the memory and the encryp-
tion can start right after that. The address of the plaintexts, the expanded keys and
the LUTS offsets can be programmed into the encryption controller using software.
When the encryption process is activated, the encryption controller will take control
of the memory interface to do the encryption.
After the memory is configured with the LUTs and the expanded key and the
plaintexts are written into the memory, the encryption can be started by the encryp-
tion controller. Table 4.2 summarizes the mapping of AES operations into SmartMem
operations. The first operation in the AES algorithm is AddRoundKey. This oper-
ation is the XOR of the plaintexts and the key, therefore, it is done by using the
smart-write operation. The wordline containing plaintexts and the key will be se-
lected and the read data will be applied with XOR. The output data is written back
into the memory directly. The second operation is ShiftRows. ShiftRows is done by
a normal read operation with the addresses of 4 memory banks form a diagonal of
the state matrix. To read out the diagonal of the 4×4 matrix, the four addresses of
the memory are added with 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively at first. After that, these
addresses are shifted to read the remaining ShiftRows values. Because ShiftRows are
simply normal reads, they can also be integrated into Subbyte&MulcolMultiply. The
last operation is Subbyte&MulcolMultiply which is carried out by using the output
data from ShiftRows as the address to look up the corresponding values in the LUTs.
The output data has to be added with the LUTs’ offsets to select the correct LUTs
for the operation. To further optimize the mapping process, ShiftRows, SubBytes
and MixColumns are combined to use one normal read, one look-up operation and
three smart-write operations for each 32-bit data.
Figure 4.10 shows the performance evaluation for AES implementation using a
32-bit datapath on SmartMem. It shows the number of clock cycles which each step
needs. AddRoundkeys takes one cycle for 32-bit data and four cycles for 128-bit
data. ShiftRows needs one clock cycle to perform the normal read for 32-bit data.
SubBytes and MixcColumns need 3 XOR and one look-up, therefore, it needs four
cycles for 32-bit datapath. In total, the AES mapping on SmartMem using 32-bit
datapath requires 232 clock cycles to finish an encryption.
It is also possible to implement the AES encryption algorithm on a single mem-
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Table 4.2: Mapping of AES operations into SmartMem operations
AES’ operations SmartMem’s operations
AddRoundKey Smart-Write: Selecting wordlines of plaintexts
and corresponding key to apply XOR and write
back.
ShiftRows Normal read operation: Read each memory us-
ing diagonal addresses of a 4×4 matrix
Subbyte&MulcolMultiply Three smart-write operations (smart-write and
write back) and one normal read
SubBytes for the last round Look-up operations
state ← plaintext
For r = 1…9:
AddRoundKey(state, Kr-1)
ShiftRows(state)
SubBytes&MixColMultiply(state)
XOR(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k9)
ShiftRows(state)
SubByte(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k10)
Ciphertext ← state
4 cycles
4x3 cycles
4x2 cycles
4 cycles
24 x 9 cycles
4 cycles
4 cycles
4 cycles
Performance: 32-bit datapath
Figure 4.10: AES 32-bit datapath using SmartMem.
ory bank to reduce hardware area and power consumption. In addition, with this
configuration, multiple banks can be used to do parallel encryption to improve the
throughput. In this case, instead of using multiple memories, a single memory bank
with a size of 2048 words is used. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the performance evalu-
ation of AES with 8-bit datapath on SmartMem. In 8-bit datapath, 1024 bytes are
used to store 4 LUTs of the SubByte&MixColMultiply. 160 bytes are used to store
the expanded key. As a consequence, only 864 bytes are used to store plaintexts, tem-
porary data and ciphertexts. Each step is performed on 1 byte. As a result, each step
needs to be repeated 16 times. In summary, the 8-bit datapath architecture needs
874 clock cycles to finish one encryption. Table 4.3 presents the memory required
to store the LUTs and data for encryption. In 8-bit datapath, a single 2048-word
memory bank is used and 592 bytes are available for user data while 1456 bytes are
used to store the LUTs and the expanded key.
In summary, it is possible to map AES algorithm using only SmartMem’s opera-
tions. AES works on a byte data. Therefore, it can be implemented using a 4-byte
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State ← plaintext
For r = 1…9:
AddRoundKey(state, Kr-1)
ShiftRows(state)
SubBytes&MixColMultiply(state)
XOR(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k9)
ShiftRows(state)
SubByte(state)
AddRoundKey(state, k10)
Ciphertext ← state
16 cycles
16x3 cycles
16x2 cycles
16 cycles
90 x 9 cycles
16 cycles
16 cycles
16 cycles
Performance: 8-bit datapath
Figure 4.11: AES 8-bit datapath using SmartMem.
Table 4.3: Memory size to store the expanded key, look-up table for SubBytes and
Mixcolumns of 8-bit datapath architecture
Name Quantity Size (byte) Total size (byte)
Key storage (expanded key) 11 16 176
S-Box&MixcolMultiply table 4 256 1024
S-Box table 1 256 256
Total 1456
Remaining for users’ data 592
datapath (32-bit datapath) or an 8-bit datapath. This section presents the detailed
mapping of the AES operations into the SmartMem’s operations. The encryption
controller will control the read/write operations and smart-read/smart-write opera-
tions. The AES operations are decomposed into multiple operations of SmartMem,
whereas shiftRows, SubBytes and MixColumns are combined into a normal read fol-
lowed by a look-up and XORs. The mapping has been demonstrated using VHDL and
the SmartMem model. The 32-bit datapath architecture of AES using four memory
banks of 8-bit width takes 232 clock cycles for one encryption. The 8-bit datapath
architecture using a single memory bank needs 874 clock cycle per encryption.
4.3.2 PRESENT
Lightweight cryptography algorithms can also be implemented using In-Memory
Computing. Specifically, when being implemented in specific hardware
crypto-accelerators using bit-based operations, lightweight cryptography utilizes the
hardware constructs to reduce the hardware cost and power consumption. This is in
contrast to conventional cryptography algorithms which are optimized for software
implementation with operations on bytes. However, it is the bit-based operations
that make lightweight cryptography less efficient in comparison with software
implementation. Thus, this section is set to examine the possibility to implement
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bit-based operations of cryptography algorithms using SmartMem through the
implementation of PRESENT.
PRESENT is an algorithm optimized for hardware implementation. Implement-
ing it using SmartMem operations is more complicated because PRESENT uses bit-
based operations. PRESENT contains only two operations: S-box and wire permu-
tation. Since, S-Box of PRESENT uses 4-bit S-Box, there will be a redundant to
store them in the 8-bit memory. In addition, the wire permutation in PRESENT
makes it less efficient in both software implementation and in SmartMem. Figure
4.12 demonstrates the permutation layer in PRESENT. The permutation is done at
the bit level making it hard to implement PRESENT on SmartMem. Furthermore,
the output of S-Boxes will be used as inputs to permutation. This leads to the idea
of combining S-Boxes and permutation to use Look-Up Table [Benadjila2013ilb] for
SmartMem.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Byte 0 Byte 1 Byte 2 Byte 3
Byte 0 Byte 2
Figure 4.12: PRESENT bit permutation.
It can be seen from Figure 4.12 that the first byte after permutation is constructed
by bit 0 and bit 4 of 4 input bytes, while the second byte after permutation is from
bit 1 and bit 5 and so on. We can calculate the LUTs for PRESENT by using the
following equation:
sbox permuted = sbox0||sbox4||sbox1||sbox5||sbox2||sbox6||sbox3||sbox7 (4.1)
In equation 4.1, || is the bit concatenation operator. This means that each individual
bit of the S-box is permuted using this order: 0, 4, 1, 5, 2, 6, 3, 7. Then, the look-up
table can be generated using these equations:
LUT1 = sbox permuted (4.2)
LUT2 = sbox permuted << 2 (4.3)
LUT3 = sbox permuted << 4 (4.4)
LUT4 = sbox permuted << 6 (4.5)
In the above equation, << is the circular shift operator. The look-up tables are
created by circularly shifting the sbox permuted with a different number of bits.
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After the look-up tables are generated, the organization of these look-up tables
using the memory structure as described in section 4.3.1 is demonstrated in Figure
4.13. Each memory bank contains 4 LUTs of size 256 bytes and 4 bytes of bit masks.
The purpose of the bit masks is to select only 2-bit at a time. These two bits, which
are the outputs of the S-box after permutation, will be XORed with the expanded
key, therefore, only selected bit are selected using these bit masks.
The encryption is carried out by selecting a word and then selectively applying the
bit mask and applying the XOR. They are a combination of smart-read and smart-
write operations. For example, to create the first byte of the output of a round,
the input data was used as an address to look-up through the LUTs to select the
first 2-bit of the first 4 bytes. Also, a mask is used to apply to each look-up, and
the outputs after masking are ORed together to form the output byte. This is done
repeatedly to get the output of a round.
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Figure 4.13: 32-bit architecture for PRESENT on SmartMem.
Table 4.4 summarizes the memory requirements to store the look-up tables and
the expanded key for this implementation. 31 expanded keys must be stored in the
memory along with 4×4 of 8-bit S-boxes-permuted tables. 4 Masks are also needed for
each memory bank. This results in the total requirements of 4422 bytes of memory
for 32-bit datapath architecture. With this memory configuration, 3770 bytes are
remained for storing temporary data, plaintexts and ciphertexts. The total number
of clock cycles to finish one encryption is 873 clock cycles. PRESENT on SmartMem
employs a large number of clock cycles for one encryption because of its bit based
permutation which leads to the use of bit masks for each encryption.
In summary, PRESENT was designed with the hardware construct to reduce the
area and power consumption of the hardware implementation. However, when it
comes to software implementation, bit masks have to be applied which brings about
the inefficiency of the software implementation. For its implementation on SmartMem
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Table 4.4: Memory size to store the expanded key, look-up table for substitution,
permutation and masks of a PRESENT 32-bit datapath architecture
Name Quantity Size (byte) Total size (byte)
Key storage (expanded key) 31 10 310
S-box 8-bit and permutation table 4×4 256 4096
Mask table 4 4 16
Total 4422
Remaining for users’ data 3770
using 8-bit memory bank like the one in AES implementation, the S-boxes and the
permutation can be combined into a look-up table. After that, bit masks can be
applied to get the expected output. However, because of the use of a large number of
bit masks operation, PRESENT with 32-bit architecture requires 873 clock cycles to
finish one encryption of 64-bit data block. To encryption 128 bits of data, PRESENT
will need 1746 clock cycles. Compared to AES implementation using Smartmem with
only 232 clock cycles per 128 bits of data, PRESENT is nearly eight times slower
than AES. In term of memory overhead, PRESENT uses about 800 bytes less than
AES when implemented using SmartMem.
4.4 Conclusion
Crypto-accelerators can help achieve ultra-low-power consumption with low hardware
cost, but it is also enclosed with some drawbacks in terms of security points of view.
Crypto-accelerators implement a specific algorithm and have specific optimizations to
get low power and small hardware footprint. However, the IoT standards continually
evolve to cope with critical vulnerabilities and to mitigate security threats. Mean-
while, crypto-accelerators with fixed structures and algorithms cannot keep up with
this constant change. In addition to that, today’s widely used integrated circuits are
critically vulnerable to hardware trojans which can be embedded by a third-party IP
hardware vendor to monitor the system bus or to leak secret data.
In-Memory Computing is a new promising technology which can enable the in-
place processing of information. In-Memory Computing uses the memory itself to do
logical operations such as AND, OR, XOR and so on, and some basic arithmetic op-
erations with the help of some extra circuits in the peripherals. This type of memory
is not only applicable to accelerate different types of calculations but also employable
to implement various security primitives. Security primitives implemented using this
technology can reduce the risks of moving secret data through the system bus and
the overhead of data transfer.
In-Memory Computing can be designed using various technologies such as Do-
main Wall Nano Wires, Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) or Complement Metal Oxide
Semiconductor (CMOS). SmartMem was proposed by Akyel et al. and implemented
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based on the concepts of In-Memory Computing using the current CMOS technolo-
gies. This has been seen as an innovative idea to move the computation close to the
place where the data are stored. Some benefits could be claimed from mapping data
encryption algorithm into the SmartMem, for instance, saving the memory band-
width, saving the power consumption, and saving time to move the data from the
memory to the processor or the crypto core and vice versa. However, under current
conditions, it is challenging to map the algorithm using pure memory operation.
The SmartMem proposed by Akyel et al. uses 10T SRAM bitcells with one write
port and two read ports to enable the smart operations. Specifically, two read ports
can be used to select two different wordlines for smart operations. Also, logical op-
erations are performed using the memory structure itself. Some other operations
including XOR and arithmetic operations are performed by adding small extra cir-
cuits to the peripheral circuits of the memory.
In this chapter, the implementations of AES, a traditional cryptography algo-
rithm, and PRESENT, a lightweight block cipher, into SmartMem are proposed
using the SmartMem model. It is possible to implement them using the memory
as a look-up table in combination with smart in-memory operations. The mapping
involves using many sub-steps, hence, requires more clock cycles to finish. For AES
with 32-bit datapath using four memory banks of 8-bit width, it needs 232 clock cycles
for one encryption. PRESENT even needs 873 clock cycles to finish one encryption
because of its bit-based permutation. In terms of throughput, PRESENT has nearly
eight times slower than AES when being implemented in SmartMem using 32-bit
datapath. In comparison with the crypto-accelerator solutions proposed in Chapter
3, the implementations in Memory are five times slower than the hardware crypto-
accelerator for AES. Also, the obtained results are 27 times faster than the software
implementation using ARM processor Cortex M0 as presented in [Zhang2018rar].
This indicates the potential of In-Memory Computing which needs further studies
on the overall SmartMem architectures and system level designs, and more precisely
the usage of them for security. In addition, the implementations in SmartMem can
be updated to accommodate new requirements. This demonstrates the trade-offs of
flexibility and configurability along with the conventional parameters including the
cost, throughput and power consumption.
In addition, because of the serial operations of the memory, various existing coun-
termeasures for software implementation are applicable to the In-Memory Comput-
ing. Multiple memory operations can be executed in parallel using different memory
banks which support the implementation of masking countermeasure. In addition,
code polymorphism can be applied to independent operations. However, this study
is considered a preliminary work on using SmartMem to accelerate cryptography al-
gorithms, living a promising direction for further investigations. Further researches
could offer an in-deep exploration on power/energy estimation and security evalua-
tion.
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Conclusion and perspectives
Internet-of-Things, with the core idea of connecting millions of objects is delivering
new business value and benefits, simultaneously accelerating new challenges, espe-
cially security constraints which have been highlighted throughout this manuscript.
Evidently, IoT systems collect massive amount of private data, process them and
send them through the Internet to the cloud which is supposedly a dangerous envi-
ronment. Therefore, security must be a fundamental enabler, instead of an option
for IoT.
However, implementing security for IoT is really challenging. The primary rea-
son lies in IoT’s association with multiple layers with different capabilities and its
integration of thousands or millions of devices. In addition, IoT sensor nodes are ex-
pected to be long lifetime, ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost devices, which makes
it somehow vary from the underlying computer-based system or embedded systems.
IoT backed devices might use battery-based power supply or self-harvest energy from
the environment and have small memory footprint, adequate computation and lim-
ited power budget. Meanwhile, underlying security functions normally rely on strong
cryptography algorithms such as block ciphers, hash functions, and/or public key
cryptography which not only require complicated computations and large power con-
sumption, but also reduce the system throughput. As a consequence, an optimal
trade-off among security levels, hardware area and power/energy consumption must
be taken into account when designing security functions for these devices.
Recent IoT proposals largely focus on using AES as the main security mechanism
because AES has been studied for a long time with the security levels ranging from
midterms to long terms. With advancements of cryptography, many new lightweight
cryptography algorithms can also be employed to reduce the hardware cost and lower
the power consumption. However, lightweight algorithms have not been chosen for
the IoT proposals. Furthermore, different IoT applications might have diverse secu-
rity profiles with different power/energy budgets. Therefore, the security solutions
of a wide range of IoT applications need the configurability and flexibility. Depend-
ing on the security requirements of the applications, strong security mechanisms or
lightweight ones can be selected to minimize the power consumption.
On the other hand, ultra-low-power security solutions for IoT applications gener-
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ally focus on implementing the hardware accelerator for some specific algorithms to
reduce the hardware cost and power consumption. Meanwhile, fixed hardware accel-
erators are not really adaptable to ever-evolving standards and threats. Therefore,
flexible and configurable designs are needed to keep up with the evolution of IoT
standards and security attacks. This helps prolong the lifetime of IoT applications.
This work investigates lightweight data encryption implementation for security in
IoT in terms of power consumption and energy consumption. A block cipher module
with two algorithms, AES and PRESENT were proposed with power optimization
techniques. The proposed block cipher module provides multi-security levels with
different key size ranging from 80 bits up to 256 bits. This module can also tai-
lor specific requirements of the applications. The implementation results in SNACk
testchip using FD-SOI 28nm technology from STMicroelectronics shows that this
module is able to provide medium throughput of around 20Mbps at 10MHz and
to consume less than 24µW at 0.6V . At the subthreshold voltage of 0.4V and the
operating frequency of 10MHz, the proposed design consumes an energy of about
0.4pJ/bit with a power consumption of around 10µW , which meets the demand of
ultra-low-power consumption. Furthermore, the security evaluation based on Corre-
lation Power Analysis and Test Vector Leakage Assessment using power-estimated
traces shows that the proposed optimization does not introduce new leakages when
compared with the reference design on Opencores. On the other hand, the block
cipher accelerator might have low power consumption, but it still leaves some draw-
backs, for instance, the data have to be transmitted from the memory to the system
bus and the accelerator for processing. This will increase the power consumption of
the system and possibly expose the data to other IP cores which monitor the bus.
Therefore, this work continues to investigate an innovative method for doing data
encryption which is called In-Memory Encryption. In-Memory Encryption uses a
special type of memory which is capable of doing logical operation such as AND,
OR, NOT and XOR. Using this type of memory, this work fully implemented the
same algorithms but using only the infrastructure of In-Memory Computing. In-
memory AES with 32-bit datapath needs 232 clock cycles for one encryption of 128
bits, and more than 873 clock cycles for 8-bit datapath. In the case of PRESENT
with 32-bit datapath, because of its bit based hardware permutation, it requires more
than 873 clock cycles for one encryption of a 64-bit block. In-memory PRESENT
implementation is nearly eight times slower than in-memory AES to encrypt a 128-
bit data block. Even with a large number of cycles when compared with the cus-
tomized ASIC as in SNACk, they still show potentials in terms of security features.
Based on this preliminary work on the implementation of cryptography algorithms
using In-Memory Computing, further research works on power/energy consumption
estimation, security evaluation and countermeasure designs should be conducted to
evaluate the effectiveness of In-Memory Computing. Additionally, future studies at
architecture levels and system levels are also important to improve the overall system
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performance and security features.
There are a number of gaps in this study around adaptable security solutions, par-
ticularly flexible and configurable security solutions that calls for further researches.
Accordingly, IoT applications should be proactive to different standards and capable
of mitigating different attacks. However, the flexibility and configurability have to
be traded-off with the throughput and power consumption; thereby the most feasible
trade-off should be considered in order to improve the lifetime of devices. First of all,
software implementations of security solutions can be updated using the firmware
updates or software updates which provide flexibility. However, these approaches
tend to work inefficiently in terms of throughput and power consumption. In ad-
dition, adaptability in hardware can improve throughput and power consumption
when compared with software solutions. On the other hand, it is still less efficient
than application specific implementations. Therefore, future applications should put
forwards with the adaptability in design and implementation of security solutions
in hardware to new standards or new threats to reduce hardware cost. Even reno-
vating architectures from system levels down to device or transistor levels should be
thoroughly considered.
In addition, this work does not take into account the countermeasures. Counter-
measures are costly regarding power/energy consumption. However, their importance
with regard to hardware-security has widely been acknowledged. Accordingly, ultra-
low-power and ultra-low-cost countermeasures will be an interesting topic for future
researches. In addition, the purpose of countermeasure is to cope with different types
of attacks or analyses such as power analysis fault attack or so. Thus, countermea-
sures could employ additional hardware to facilitate the defense, which leads to a
significant increase in hardware cost and power consumption. For this reason, they
are currently not suitable for ultra-low-power and ultra-low-cost devices. Moreover,
countermeasures for one type of attacks might not protect designs from the other
types of attacks. Therefore, adaptive countermeasures should be prioritized for fu-
ture practice on the IoT system. Furthermore, the cost and power consumption
trade-offs should also be figured out.
Furthermore, In-Memory Computing sheds a new light on designing flexible se-
curity solutions as well as hardware security solutions. Accordingly, multiple coun-
termeasures for various kinds of attacks including both power analysis attacks and
fault attacks can be integrated using the current facilities of memory designs. For
example, Error Correcting Code designs included in high reliable memories can be
utilized to detect errors during the encryption in memory operation to deal with
the fault attacks. In order to mitigate power analysis attacks, conventional methods
such as masking or code polymorphism can be used at a small cost using In-Memory
Computing. Also, masking eliminates the correlation of the key-dependent power
consumption by running random operations at the same time with the key depen-
dent operations. The parallel operations are supported by In-Memory Computing
by default. Nevertheless, code polymorphism diminishes the correlation by reorder-
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ing the operations of algorithms. Because of the serial operations of In-Memory
Computing, code polymorphism can be easily deployed using this technology. These
examples reveal the potentials of using In-Memory Computing to create adaptable
solutions for both security algorithm mapping and countermeasures. This can be a
promising research area to improve the overall security of a system without sacrificing
power/energy consumption.
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